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Abstract
With the increasing availability of large collections of personal and sensitive
information to a wide range of user communities, services should take more
responsibility for data privacy when disseminating information, which requires data
sharing control. In most cases, data are stored in a repository at the site of the domain
server, which takes full responsibility for their management. The data can be provided
to known recipients, or published without restriction on recipients. To ensure that
such data is used without breaching privacy, proper access control models and
privacy protection methods are needed.
This thesis presents an approach to protect personal and sensitive information that is
stored on one or more data servers. There are three main privacy requirements that
need to be considered when designing a system for privacy-preserving data access.
The first requirement is privacy-aware access control. In traditional privacy-aware
contexts, built-in conditions or granular access control are used to assign user
privileges at a fine-grained level. Very frequently, users and their privileges are
diverse. Hence, it is necessary to deploy proper access control on both subject and
object servers that impose the conditions on carrying out user operations. This thesis
vi2
defines a dual privacy-aware access control model, consisting of a subject server that
manages user privileges and an object server that deals with granular data. Both
servers extract user operations and server conditions from the original requests and
convert them to privacy labels that contain access control attributes. In cross-domain
cases, traditional solutions adopt roaming tables to support multiple-domain access.
However, building roaming tables for all domains is costly and maintaining these
tables can become an issue. Furthermore, when roaming occurs, the party responsible
for multi-domain data management has to be clearly identified. In this thesis, a
roaming adjustment mechanism is presented for both subject and object servers. By
defining such a dual server control model and request process flow, the responsibility
for data administration can be properly managed.
The second requirement is the consideration of access purpose, namely why the
subject requests access to the object and how the subject is going to use the object.
The existing solutions overlook the different interpretations of purposes in distinct
domains. This thesis proposes a privilege-oriented, purpose-based method that
enhances the privacy-aware access control model mentioned in the previous
paragraph. It includes a component that interprets the subject's intention and the
conditions imposed by the servers on operations; and a component that caters for
object types and object owner's intention.
The third requirement is maintaining data utility while protecting privacy when data
are shared without restriction on recipients. Most existing approaches achieve a high
level of privacy at the expense of data usability. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no solution that is able to keep both. This thesis combines data privacy protection
vi3
with data utility by building a framework that defines a privacy protection process
flow. It also includes two data privacy protection algorithms that are based on
Chebyshev polynomials and fractal sequences, respectively. Experiments show that
the both algorithms are resistant to two main data privacy attacks, but with little loss
of accuracy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We live in the information age, and personal information has become one of the most
valuable resources. This includes personal data (e.g. date of birth, address, age,
gender etc.), personal preference data (e.g. habits and hobbies) and generated
personal data (e.g. medical data) [142]. Commercial data consumers can use these
data for service or product improvement to target specific customers or to reduce
market costs, and such information is also widely used for research, data modeling
and government statistics. Various data repositories store significant amount of
personal data, which include statistics bureaux, healthcare data centers, education
institutes, non-profit organizations and companies. To make the best use of the stored
data, it is usually released in one form or another, commercially or non-commercially.
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Often, data contain sensitive or confidential information. Releasing data without any
precaution (e.g. without proper sanitization) can lead to privacy problems, such as
improper use of data or the release of personally identifiable information. In fact,
privacy issues have been a major concern in the utilization of personal data [1]. To
eliminate the threat of privacy breaches and to comply with various organizational
policies, legal regulations, subscription conditions and so forth, when data is shared
with data consumers, privacy preserving techniques have to be implemented [157].
Privacy preserving techniques can be classified into two categories, based on the
target data consumers, namely data sharing with known recipients and data sharing
with unknown recipients. The former indicates the data consumers are known and
traceable by the data holder, whereas the latter indicates the data are free for any
parties to use and these parties usually cannot be traced or data access cannot be
further controlled after the data has been published.
Privacy protection techniques implemented in the first category are usually called
privacy aware data access control. These techniques regulate the data consumers’
privileges so as to prevent improper user behavior in relation to the received data.
Privacy protection techniques in the second category are usually called data privacy
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protection or privacy preserving for data publishing. These two categories will be
discussed in Part I and Part II of the thesis, respectively.
1.1 Overview and Motivation
1.1.1 Privacy Aware Data Access Control
Data access control is one of the fundamental information management mechanisms.
It determines the availability of resources, permissible user behavior and deals with
related conditions [2]. Figure 1.1 depicts a typical access control system. The user
represents the data consumer who requests data access. A policy-based decision
maker interacts with users and when a user requests access to a resource, it forms an
appropriate access request that includes the necessary control attributes. Then, such a
request is passed to the system and applied according to the system policies. Lastly,
the decision maker permits or denies the user’s request.
Policy-based
decision maker Resource
Identity attributes
User
Access granted
Access request
Access denied
Figure 1.1: Typical Access Control System
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Based on the general model above, there are different approaches in this category
with different focuses. Some may protect information stored in a database, or
information relating to the method or parameters of access.
A common method of requesting access is via the web, such as using web services,
social networks etc. Web-based services, such as email or location based services
(LBS), are receiving more and more attention. One problem is selective revealing the
contents to an authorized party, showing certain parts while hiding other, sensitive
content. The approach in [3] uses a pre-analysis component to split private
information from the original data, to avoid any privacy breach. In other cases, the
users’ privacy has to be protected when essential user information is accessed by the
parties who provide services for the users (e.g. in case of LBS near by shops, gas
station, restaurant etc.). Existing work includes the study of user privacy concern [4],
evaluation of risk [5, 61, 62], balancing submitted information and received services,
installation of middleware [6], grouping to hide individuals [7], adding dummy data
[8] and perturbing the path [9]. Privacy aware access control for social networks is a
new topic and the main problems are mostly related to user (data owner) behavior and
how the service providers use the sensitive data. Research on this topic includes
survey [10, 11] and evaluation of threats [12, 13] and reducing accuracy in order to
get better privacy [14]. Works also include re-assigning identity with minimal
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collusion [63-65]. Privacy aware web-based policy enforcement mainly works on
standard computer-readable formats for privacy policies and protocols that enable
web browsers to read and process privacy policies automatically, such as P3P [15]
and its improvements that include enterprise-oriented solutions [16] and how to make
use of P3P [17].
In case of databases, in addition to protection against unauthorized access, data may
also need to be protected from the database service provider. The main problems are
keeping the privacy of the queries sent by the user, privacy of the data requested and
minimizing the workload at the user front-end and maximizing the efficiency on the
server side. Iyer et al. [18, 19] proposed a solution for minimizing the client workload,
based on a graphical representation of queries as trees. Hacigumus et al [20] show a
method for splitting the equivalent query into two sub-queries so that one of them
satisfies the user’s request and the other may insert irrelevant tuples (decided by
privacy/security methods). Methods for query protected data also include a
bucket-based approach [21] that sorts non-overlapping subsets of values dividing into
buckets of the same, predetermined size. An improved bucket-based method [22]
proposed an efficient way for partitioning the domain of attributes by minimizing the
number of spurious tuples in the result of both range and equality queries. However,
bucket-based methods are vulnerable to inference attacks [138]. A hash-based
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approach [23] generates the hash of attributes instead of using plaintext but does not
support range queries. This limitation is considered by adopting B+ trees [23], which
is an indexing method allowing every vertex to store up to n-1 search key values and
n pointers and, except for the root and leaf vertices, has at least n/2 children. Some
solutions reduce the amount of irrelevant tuples [26, 27] by applying a secure hash
function to each pair of subsequent characters of each index value, e.g. index value s
has n characters c1c2..cn and the corresponding index is
hash(c1c2)hash(c3c4)...hash(cn-1,cn). Other approaches consider encrypted databases
that employ homomorphic encryption to allow query operations to be executed over
index values [20, 28, 29]. Since not all data are considered private in a database, only
the sensitive ones need protection. An approach [19] only encrypts sensitive attributes
and leaves others in plaintext; then searching keywords in encrypted documents
[30-33] will produce all documents containing a particular keyword without the need
to know any other information. Anther approach [34] modeled privacy requirements
through confidentiality constrains such as sets of attributes and approaches to enforce
privacy policies [35, 36].
In organizational scenarios, data access control usually concerns user privilege
control, user privilege in collaboration environment and purpose-based access control.
Part I of the thesis focuses on this category because it is significant for contemporary
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data sharing scenarios and improper access can lead to a privacy leak. The focuses in
these scenarios are as following [100, 101, 118].
 Unique users
 Complex (diverse) privileges, containing various privileges and conditional
privileges
 Fine-grained data control
 Cross-domain application
 Purpose-based
Unique users and complex privileges are often considered together in the literature
[100, 101]. A particularly difficult issue is administering unique users who come and
leave system and have diverse privileges that include not only simple operations, such
as read an object, but also complex onces (e.g. edit, sign) and can have associated
conditions, such as if...then.... In Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) privileges are
assigned to users via role subscriptions: privileges are assigned to roles and each user
is classified into one or more roles. In such a model, users are not able to acquire
permissions directly, only through their roles, which simplifies many common
operations, such as adding a user, or changing a user's department [37, 38].
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While RBAC is often used, unique users with diverse privileges are very hard to
assign to traditional roles [101]. A number attempts have been made to support
unique user management [102-105] and complex privileges [107-108]. To support
unique users in RBAC, roles can have attributes [49, 110] or parameters that tailor a
role to the individual user [129, 42]. Approaches include different conditional role
approaches, such as user access conditions [39, 49, 129], user component-based [97]
and situation-based [98] access control.
Other important issues are providing access to parts of data items, referred to as
fine-grained, granular access control. Mechanisms have been proposed for this in
[107, 108] and approaches considering both granular data and user privilege control
have been presented in [102-105, 108, 110]. User-oriented and data-oriented
management have to be considered together for complete access control.
As more and more parties are working together and sharing data among each others,
the control mechanisms for a single domain have to be extended for cross-domain
applications, and that involves user privilege and data access control adjustments.
These adjustments are to support subject (user) and object (data) roaming. Subject
roaming denotes that users temporarily join a foreign domain and request access to
resources in the user domain while object roaming denotes that an object is requested
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by a foreign subject and such object needs to be delivered to such foreign domain.
Different domains may have different roles, resources and access rules, and roaming
user role adjustment and privilege refinement can be difficult [44]. Solutions usually
build a roaming table to map a role in one domain to a role in another domain
[111-112], while others adopt user agents [113-115]. For the cross-domain
environments, many attempts are providing roaming adjustment support, such as
roaming table [111-112], attribute mapping [46], temporarily assigning constraints
[47], user agents [113-114], policy agents [115], threats detection [43, 45] and
multi-domain relationship approach [44].
However, the existing solutions are not able to cater for diverse privileges with
conditions on fine-grained granular data. They also overlooked server constraints
either on the user or on the data side. Furthermore, none of them are able to fully
satisfy the needs of user roaming, data roaming and both happen at the same time.
Therefore, a new user privilege control model is needed for roles with diverse
privileges, and to allow many unique users come and leave in cross-domain
environments.
The main problems of building the new user privilege control model are i) a large
number of users need different complex privileges, which makes it hard to group all
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users into roles; ii) collaboration control on granular data and iii) user roles and
privileges maintenance in cross-domain environments. Once users and resources are
roaming across multiple domains, the management of responsibility becomes
complex, such as who should be responsible for a roaming user requesting access to
roaming data. The problems stated above are addressed by the proposed dual control
model containing user privilege and granular data, with a roaming adjustment
mechanism (Chapter 2).
Although the problem of unique users with diverse privileges in cross-domain
environments has been looked at, for privacy preserving access control the purpose of
access also need to be considered [118]. To address this problem, purpose-based
access control (PBAC) has emerged that regulates access according to purpose. A
classic PBAC model, such as [118], uses access purpose as the basis of access control.
This was later improved with the definition of intended purpose [116], developing an
organizational model [50] and the introduction of usage control [126]. Other
extensions include the support of conditional roles [127], conditional intended
purpose [125], spatial role and spatial purpose [44], intended purpose management
[117, 122], privilege chain [119] and purpose flow management [120, 123]. In
addition, a data element-oriented model was proposed in [124]. These models
improve the applicability of PBAC to practical scenarios. However, these purposes
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depend heavily on users, application domains and environments. The meaning of a
purpose can be translated to different operations and may lead to distinct privileges in
cross-domain environments. Ignoring this can cause privilege conflicts in
collaborating scenarios.
The main problem that needs to be investigated in purpose-based access control is
cross-domain purpose translation and privilege adjustment. This will be addressed by
the proposed purpose based access control model (Chapter 3).
The problems of data publishing to known recipients have a significant impact on
many privacy-aware access control models. Models that solve these problems are able
to provide privacy protection for data sharing to known recipients, provide better
flexibility for large enterprises, and enable total management for data in cross-domain
environments. Lack of concerns of the problems can cause privacy breach and affect
operation performance during data sharing.
1.1.2 Privacy Protection of Published Data
As there is a loss of control over data once published, in such scenarios data require
additional protection, such as anonymization (or de-identification [48]), to avoid any
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privacy or security breach [51]. Data anonymization is widely adopted by the census
bureau, healthcare data centers and government agencies [57].
Traditional data anonymity approaches simply removed identifying fields from the
released data, such as social security number and name. However, some studies have
shown that even without any personally identifiable information (PII) [138], a
collection of certain personal attributes can still enable the identification of a large
proportion of the population. In an example described by Sweeney [52], a dataset
collected by an insurance commission contained medical records of Massachusetts
state employees. Although any identifiers such as name, social security numbers and
phone numbers were removed from the data, a large number of individuals were still
identified by using information such as date of birth, post code and gender from a
voter registration list. As it turned out, among those identified was the state governor
who authorized the data release [52]. Another research [53] showed that around 87%
of the population of the United States can be uniquely identified using the seemingly
innocuous attributes of gender, date of birth and 5-digit zip code. In another case,
AOL published a 2 GB file containing approximately 20 million search queries from
650,000 of its users and the anonymization scheme used to protect the data consisted
of assigning a pseudonym random number to each AOL user and replacing the user
ID with this number [55]. Later on, two New York Times reporters used the search
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key words such as name of the town, last name, age-related information etc to
re-identify a few persons from the published data [57]. Netflix, a movie rental service,
announced the Netflix Prize for the development of an accurate movie
recommendation algorithm based on a large amount of movie rating information for
18,000 movie titles [58]. Soon Frankowski et al [59] pointed out the potential risk and
then the amount of rating data was successfully attacked [60].
The information used to identify individuals in the above three examples is called
Quasi-identifier (QI). Clearly, whether a piece of information can be a QI depends on
its usability to identify individuals rather than on the data type. The principle behind
the identity revealing process is that by linking several released data sets, the overlap
of the data sets becomes smaller until the overlap can uniquely identify individuals.
This identity revealing process is also called data linkage or triangulation attack.
The three main approaches to providing data privacy are generalization and
suppression, anatomization and permutation, and perturbation [73].
Generalization and suppression is one way of resisting data linkage attacks. It is
exemplified by k-anonymity [53,66] that ensures that for every record in the released
data table, there are at least k-1 other records that have exactly the same values for the
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quasi-identifiers. This can be achieved by data suppression or generalization for
example. However, several limitations of the k-anonymity were found later [68] and
an improved method called l-diversity was proposed [67]. The l-diversity model
requires that every group of indistinguishable records contains at least one distinct
sensitive attribute value. Later, several privacy models were proposed, that quantified
adversarial knowledge such as (c,k)-safety [69] limited the maximum privacy
disclosure to less than c, and 3D privacy criterion [70] for safe data release. These
models are stricter than k-anonymity but are hard to implement in real life as the data
can be random, and satisfaction of these models can require even more modification
than k-anonymity does. Also, there are some extensions to k-anonymity and
l-diversity such as [72] presented a model by combining randomization and data
transformation, but it is yet to be realized. The full domain generalization method,
such as [74], generalizes attributes to the same value, while in the subtree
generalization approach [75-78] at a nonleaf node (attribute), either all child values or
none are generalized. Such generalization method is also called global re-coding. At
the same time, cell generalization [79-80], also called local re-coding, allows some
values of an attribute remain un-generalized. For example, let us have two classes
called “professionals” and “artists”. “Professionals” contains “engineers” and
“lawyers”, and “artists” contains “writers” and “dancers”. Global re-coding happens
if every “lawyer” is generalized to “professional”, as well as every “engineer” to
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“professional”. Local re-coding happens if one “engineer” is generalized to
“professional”, while allowing other “engineers” to remain unchanged. An extended
generalization method, called multi-dimentional generalization considers multiple QI
attributes as a tuple, and each QI can be decided whether to be generalized regardless
of other QI attributes [81-83]. There are also different suppression schemes. Value
suppression [84-85] refers to suppressing every value of a given attribute in a dataset,
while cell suppression [86], also called local suppression, refers to suppressing some
values of a given attribute in a dataset.
Anatomization and permutation: Anatomization de-associates QIs and sensitive
attributes rather than modifying either of them, such as in [87]. Permutation partitions
a set of data records into groups and shuffles their sensitive values within each group
[88].
Perturbation is similar to generalization as it also modifies the data, but has the
advantage of being reversible if an accessor has the restoration key. A data linkage
attack cannot be performed as the real data is not available to unauthorized users [96].
Perturbation works with additive or multiplicative noise [89-92, 149, 152], data
swapping [79, 87, 93, 150, 167] and/or synthetic data generation [94, 95].
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Although generalization and suppression cannot totally eliminate the threat of data
linkage attacks, the principle of changing the target values and making them
indistinguishable from the original effectively reduces the possibility of such attacks
[73]. Data privacy is preserved if the adversaries are not able to derive the original
data from the modified (e.g. perturbed) data or the re-constructed results are not close
enough to the original data.
By adopting the above privacy preservation definition, most generalization techniques
are able to meet this requirement. However, such techniques pay a high cost in data
utility; generalization changes the distribution and other data features of the data
partly or totally. Anatomization and permutation are vulnerable to data linkage attacks,
while perturbed data changes the data format or range, and keeps only certain data
statistical properties [73].
The central problem of privacy preserving data publishing is how to keep data
privacy while maintaining data utility. Depending on the application, utility can be
data distribution, data format and data range, and an authorized data recipient should
be able to restore the original data while others can only access processed data [48].
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1.2 Contributions
There are two main research questions that will be investigated in Part I and Part II
of the thesis:
i) How to preserve privacy of data shared with known users?
ii) How to protect privacy of published data while maintaining data utility?
In Part I, the thesis proposes a privacy preserving data access control (PPDAC) model
that can be instantiated for practical applications. The model is built according to the
information privacy protection concept in [51] and it considers three aspects: users
(subjects), sensitive data (objects) and controlled disclosure (access privileges). In
addition, the model extends the features of the privacy aware role-based access
control model (P-RBAC) and the purpose-based access control model (PBAC) by
creating a multi-layer control model that deals with collaboration management of
both users and resources. The model focuses on user privileges and builds a solid,
controllable, label-based mechanism to handle granular data.
Part II of the thesis proposes data perturbation algorithms to protect the privacy of
published data and maintain data utility. The algorithms generate perturbation noise
and combine it with the original data in order to thwart data reconstruction attacks
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[73]. In addition, a controllable perturbation mechanism ensures the processed data’s
utility.
The contributions of this thesis are as follows.
When sharing data with known recipients, the proposed model:
1) Provides flexible user privilege control that
 Allows large number of unique users be handled;
 Controls user privileges in combination with user roles and user attributes, so
that in an organization the same role can have different privileges;
 Supports a hierarchical user attributes model for accessing fine-grained data;
2) Supports complex diverse user privileges, by:
 Enabling compound user privileges that contain diverse privileges and
privilege conditions;
 Allowing for complex user behavior management and complex data access
tasks via user operation sequence control;
 Enabling multiple conditions for user access, which can contain logical
expressions.
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3) Catering for granular data control, to assist:
 Individual control for each fine-grained granular data item;
 Hierarchical granular data attribute control incorporating a user hierarchical
attribute model to form a dual control model
 Handling multiple data attributes, data categories and category specifications
4) Includes purpose-based control that considers:
 User access purpose, user obligations and server constraints
 Data purpose containing data type, allowed purpose and prohibited purpose,
and data server constraints.
 Hierarchical purpose to handle fine-grained data access requests
5) Supports cross-domain applications via:
 User role and attributes adjustment and
 data attribute adjustment when roaming across domains;
 Dynamic purpose translations between domains;
 Identifying responsibility of access enforcement when dispute occurs
Systems that use the proposed approach can implement privacy protection for data
shared between known recipients.
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When data is shared with unknown recipients, the proposed methods:
6) Allow the restoration of the original data by authorized users
7) Keep the data
 In the same format as the original data;
 In the same range as the original data;
 Indistinguishable from the original data;
 Distribution close to the original data (when the original data follows normal
or uniform distribution)
8) Resists different attacks, in particular:
 Data linkage attacks;
 Spectral Filter (SPF) attacks;
 Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction (BE-DR) attacks.
9) Increase entropy more than k-anonymity and l-diversity in most cases.
10) Allow the control of perturbation magnitude to meet different needs.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
As illustrated in Figure 1.2, the thesis consists of seven chapters in two parts.
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The first part addresses the issue of data sharing with known recipients. Chapter 2
presents the first functional module of the proposed Privacy Preserving Data Access
Control (PPDAC) model, supporting unique users with diverse privileges in
cross-domain environments. Chapter 3 presents the other module of PPDAC model
for cross-domain purpose translation, purpose representation, purpose management
including multiple purposes for users (user access purposes, server constraints) and
hanlding granular data with hierarchy data type attributes, allowed purposes,
prohibited purposes and data server constraints.
Part II addresses the issue of data sharing with unknown recipients by developing
data perturbation techniques. Chapter 4 explains a data privacy protection framework
(DP2F) and reviews the literature. It also introduces evaluation methods. Chapters 5
and 6 present two data privacy protection algorithms that are based on Chebyshev
polynomials and fractal sequences, respectively. Attack resistance is introduced and
examined in the Appendix. Finally, the thesis is concluded in Chapter 7 and future
work is suggested.
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Data has become a valuable commodity, and to avoid its misuse access to it needs to
be controlled. When data is meant to be shared with others, its protection is even
more important. Data can be shared with known recipients such as within an
organization or among controllable domains, or with unknown recipients which
usually indicates data made public.
This section discusses privacy preserving data sharing with known recipients. Here,
privacy indicates the prevention of improper use of data or the release of data which
can be used to identify individuals. In such scenario, privacy protection is usually
enforced by access control mechanisms. A widely used mechanism is role-based
access control (RBAC) which assigns user privileges according to roles. Since it was
not designed to protect privacy, many other improved and enhanced solutions have
been proposed. However, RBAC also lacks in some other features, such as support of
unique users with diverse privileges and cross-domain applications [101].
To address these issues, this section builds a privacy preserving access control model
with two built-in functional modules that deal with the enforcement of privacy
preserving access control for granular data in both single-domain and cross-domain
environments.
Chapter 2 looks into access control of unique users with multiple privileges in cross-
domain environments. Then chapter 3 presents enhanced, purpose-based access
control and focuses on user purpose and data owner's intention management, and
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proposes a privilege-oriented purpose-based access control mechanism. The overall
model will be verified in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2
Access Control in Cross-
Domain Environments
This chapter details a privacy preserving access control model for diverse privileges
that are constrained by access conditions and granular data. Privacy preserving role-
based access control (P-RBAC) is the traditional and common way in which a third
party can be prevented from accessing information by not granting certain privileges.
The proposed solution further looks into diverse privilege control for cross-domain
applications by implementing a dual control model, which contains a subject server
and an object server. As the names suggest, the subject server focuses on user
management while the object server focuses on object management. The proposed
model enables user privilege control on granular data and complex user privilege
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management. The proposed model is formally verified and the verification is
presented in chapter 3.
2.1 Introduction
Data integration and sharing is no longer restricted to office computers and local
networks but has become an integral part of our everyday lives. It is utilized on a
large scale by various organizations, corporations and government agencies [201].
Access control is crucial in case of sensitive data, for example when improper access
can compromise a person’s/organization’s privacy. While a security breach in case of
a credit card can be addressed by cancellation and re-issuance of the card, a personal
privacy breach cannot be remedied the same way. To enforce proper access control, a
widely used method is Role-based Access Control (RBAC), in which a role is viewed
as a set of access permissions for people performing certain tasks, such as a division
manager can read and edit particular data, and a sales person can only read the same
data. A major shortcoming of traditional role-based access control is that it was not
designed to enforce privacy policies and barely meets privacy protection requirements
[39]. To mitigate this limitation and support privacy policies and address privacy
protection, an extension of RBAC termed Privacy-aware Role-based Access Control
(P-RBAC), has been proposed [39].
As requirements become more stringent, access to different parts of shared data needs
to be controlled separately, and for that granular privilege control can be introduced.
CHAPTER 2 ACCESS CONTROL IN CROSS-DOMAIN ENVIRONMENTS
31
A solution has been proposed for granular privileges that are constrained by access
conditions and granular data, such as sign if no amendments required and read only
certain parts if not using an office computer [130]. Various user privileges and data
granularity make the existing solutions difficult to deploy in environments that
involve many unique users with diverse access rights. As these users can have many
distinct privileges, it is difficult to group them into roles [201]. At the same time, data
sharing between different domains becomes more and more common, but existing
approaches (such as simply mapping a subject from one role in a domain to a
different role in another domain [211]) are not able to cater for privilege adjustment
[46]. In addition, responsibility of data management in multiple domain environments
is not clearly identified either.
Considering the restrictions of existing work, this chapter addresses the problem of
granular privilege access control in both single-domain and cross-domain
environments. The problem has several challenges that were not investigated in
previous research.
 Single user account: It is desirable to define a framework that allows users in
different domains access a data server by using their original accounts in the
home domains, and without having an account in each domain.
 Granular data control and granular privilege control: For compound, multipart
data, such as used in healthcare or in collaborating organizations, fine grained
access permissions, are required.
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 User liability: When privacy is breached, the party responsible has to be clearly
identified.
To deal with these three challenges, this chapter presents a granular privilege control
model, that can be employed in both single-domain and cross-domain environment.
The module controls overall access permissions, permissions on granular data and
granular privileges on granular data. The experiments show that in multiple user
domains and data domains users with granular privilege requests are able to access
different data domains without applying for new accounts. Also, once data are
distributed without permission, it is possible to identify the party responsible.
The proposed solution not only encompasses the advantages of existing privacy-
aware access control mechanisms, but makes granular privilege adjustable for cross-
domain organizations such as in collaborating scenarios.
2.1.1 Chapter outline
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
literature on privilege control mechanisms and multiple domain applications. Section
2.3 presents basic concepts on data access control that will be used later in the thesis.
Section 2.4 proposes a privacy preserving data access control mechanism based on
granular privilege and cross-domain environments. Section 2.5 presents general and
specific examples, and implementation. This is followed by the discussion of the
proposed mechanism and a comparison with existing solutions. The chapter is
summarized in section 2.7.
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2.2 Literature Review
Privacy-aware subject (user) access control and granular data access control are key
concepts in user privilege assignment. In this section, existing approaches are
examined from two aspects: (i) how they can handle granular privileges from unique
user requests and (ii) their suitability for cross-domain application.
2.2.1 Key Concepts
2.2.1.1 Privacy-Aware Access Control
The strategy of using a formal model to represent user rights based on role
assignment is called policy-based provisioning or role-based access control (RBAC)
[2, 38]. In a role-based access control system privileges are assigned to users through
role membership: privileges are attached to roles and each user is classified into one
or more roles. The fact that users are not able to acquire permissions directly, only
through their roles, simplifies many common operations, such as adding a user, or
changing a user's department [37-38].
However, traditional role-based access control was not designed to enforce privacy
policies or to address privacy protection requirements [39]. Privacy-Aware Role-
based Access Control (P-RBAC) is a family of models that extends the traditional
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RBAC model to support privacy policies by providing hierarchical and conditional
access control [39]. The overall architecture is shown in Figure 2.1. The foundation is
the core P-RBAC model, which defines the basic elements. Hierarchical P-RBAC
introduces the notions of role hierarchy and object hierarchy. Role hierarchy
describes an inheritance relationship among roles, while object hierarchy defines a
partial ordering relation between different objects. There is one more component,
conditional P-RBAC, that introduces permission assignment, indicating the condition
under which user is granted access. In Figure 2.1, universal P-RBAC integrates the
features of conditional P-RBAC and hierarchical P-RBAC.
Figure 2.1: P-RBAC Family Model [39]
2.1.2 Granular Data Access Control
Granular data refers to the fineness with which data fields are sub-divided [40]. For
example, a postal address can be recorded with coarse granularity as a single field
shown in Figure 2.2, or broken down into individual items in a fine grain model.
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Figure 2.2: Data Granularity
Granular Data access control is generally governed by label-based mechanisms, i.e.
the functions or algorithms are executed based on the information in the labels that
are attached to subjects and objects. In some cases, different label-based policies may
apply to fine-grained data to satisfy different requirements [41].
2.2.2 Previous Solutions
2.2.2.1 Diverse Privileges
Several attempts have been made to support diverse privileges [202-205]. A solution,
by combining role-based and granular data access control, provides a goal-driven
mechanism via incorporating context information to support variable privilege
requests [207]. Users submit requests to get privileges via roles and get proper
information through object models. Conditions denote privacy policies that must be
satisfied before a data access request can be granted. A two-phase role engineering
process is used to refine proper privileges: (i) role-permission analysis produces role
and permission candidates with corresponding contexts, and then (ii) role-refinement
eliminates any ambiguity and redundancy from the roles and permissions [207].
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Another solution uses conditions that can be added to permissions to keep the number
of roles manageable and make user privilege management flexible [208]. Similarly, in
[202-205] attributes are added to the traditional role-based model to realize multiple
privileges in diverse unique user scenarios. These approaches’ central idea asserts that
allowing access can be determined based on various attributes presented by a subject
[210]. Rules specify conditions under which access is granted or denied. For example,
a bank might allow access if the subject is a teller working between the hours of 7:30
am and 5:00 pm, or the subject is a supervisor or auditor working those same hours
who also have management authorization. Specifically, in [202], a requester is
granted access to a collection of services based on a given collection of attributes,
while in [203] multiple policies are involved in refining user privileges. The method
introduced in [205] uses semantic web technologies to extend attribute-based access
control to both subject server and object server, and so user privilege and data
granularity are considered at the same time. In [229], diverse privileges are managed
by a parameterized role model. Different from previous models, this approach
replaces some parts of the roles by parameterized rules, in order to meet more
complex user requirements. The model in [42] combines attribute-based solutions
[202] and hierarchical access control [230], and proposes a user hierarchy to cater for
unique users with diverse privileges. The model in [44] uses separation of duty (SoD)
in unique user access management, and it was extended in [47] with access conditions.
Nevertheless, the object model in [207-208] is not sufficient to meet granular data
access control requirements, due to the lack of a systematic granular data control
model. In [229], role models are difficult to build before the users lodge their requests.
CHAPTER 2 ACCESS CONTROL IN CROSS-DOMAIN ENVIRONMENTS
37
Approaches [202-204, 208, 210] connect subject-based with object-based privilege
control, but do not address granular data control satisfactorily. This is because these
methods either overlook the control of different privileges on different granular data,
or overlook different conditions on both subject server and object server when user
requests are lodged. Although [205] explores the combination of subject and object
control in one model, it overlooks unique users with diverse privileges and object
granularity. The approach in [42] lacks access condition support, and the model in [44,
47] overlooks access control of granular data and user privileges associated with
duties.
2.2.2.2 Cross-domain Application
A cross-domain application requires user roaming and object roaming. Subject
roaming refers to a user lodging an access request through a domain other than the
user’s home domain. Object roaming indicates that an object is transferred to another
domain’s data server (called object server in this thesis) rather than directly to a user.
For roaming scenarios, a role-to-role mapping table, also called roaming table is used
in [211]. By building such a table, the method supports users operating in multiple
domains at the same time. Figure 2.3 gives an example of a hospital role mapping
table. However, building mapping tables for each pair of domains complicates table
management. In [212], a historical role mapping table is employed in order to reduce
the size of mapping tables created for the global environment. But when a user
requests privileges different from his role or when the conditions of the object server
the user is accessing change, maintaining historical mapping tables becomes an issue.
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In [46], attribute mapping is involved to assist user roaming, but it does not solve the
user privilege adjustment.
Figure 2.3: Hospital Role Mapping Table [211]
Another attempt [213, 214] introduces a user agent to allow subjects moving between
different domains. To gain access to a certain data in a foreign domain, the user has to
activate his role in an external organization via his home subject server. But the
approach only considers subjects in different domains; it does not address object
roaming across domains when data is transferred between servers in a global system.
Similarly, methods in [215] also adopt policy agents to address cross-domain data
sharing, but they overlook diverse user privileges and data granularity. In [43, 45], the
approach works on detecting privacy access threats in cross-domain environments but
does not provide a proper solution for privilege control in such environments. In [44],
a concept called multi-level domain relationship is defined for cross-domain
applications, but the paper does not discuss user privilege adjustment in remote
domains.
To summarize the literature, the key concepts of privacy-aware subject access control
and granular data access control have been implemented by existing data
management mechanisms, and some previous solutions have embraced these two
concepts to address strict privacy requirements in different application environments.
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For users with diverse privileges, previous approaches focused on formal models of
user privileges, which can be used to assign roles to users based on user classification
and other user attributes. Some tried to add different modules to handle diverse
privileges for users [207-209, 229]. However, in such an environment, role models
are difficult to build before users lodge their requests. In addition, the overhead of
unique users coming and going can represent a significant load. In real-world
deployments, formal role models have not scaled well, because when many users are
unique, there is no significant leverage to be gained by grouping them into roles [101].
For cross-domain applications, the issue was addressed when only a limited number
of users are involved in data sharing [211], but as the number of users grows and
multiple domains are involved, maintaining a roaming table becomes very complex.
2.3 Privacy Preserving Data Access Control
Model (PPDAC)
This section outlines the structure of Part I of the thesis graphically, with emphasis on
a privacy preserving data access control model (PPDAC, see Figure 2.4) that lays the
foundation for the model detailed in chapter 3. Additionally, basic concepts and
notation are introduced.
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Figure 2.4: Privacy Preserving Data Access Control Model (PPDAC)
The model shown in Figure 2.4 illustrates the two main components to realize the
proposed approach, which are the subject server and the object server. Each
component has two main functional modules: diverse privilege controller and
purpose-based access controller. This chapter focuses on PPDAC model and the
diverse privilege controller module, and the purpose-based access controller module
will be detailed in the next chapter.
2.3.1 Basic Concepts and Notation
This section defines the concepts and introduces notation first appearing in this
chapter; those used in the purpose-based access controller module will be defined in
chapter 3. In general, the concepts and notation will be illustrated and explained
where they are first used.
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Definition 2.1 (Subject): A Subject is an active participant such as a user or an
organization. A set of subjects is S={Si | i=1,2,...,n}, where n is the number of
subjects in a data sharing environment.
To make it consistent, the term ‘subject’ is used instead of ‘user’ in the rest of the
thesis.
Definition 2.2 (Object): An Object is a passive entity. A set of objects is O={Oi |
i=1,2,...,m}, where m is the number of objects in a data sharing environment.
Objects are the target that should be fully or partly protected, such as a patient
healthcare record or a finer-grained object like blood pressure within a patient’s
healthcare record.
Definition 2.3 (Subject Activity): A subject activity (SA) is a user operation. A
set of subject activities is SA={SAi | i=1,2,...,k }, where k is the number of subject
activities and Ω(SA) denotes a subset of SA.
Examples of user operations are read, edit, comment, redistribution and represented
by SAread, SAedit and so on.
Definition 2.4 (Subject Activity Sequence): A subject activity sequence (SAS) is
a container of subject activities, their relationships and order of execution.
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The relationship between two activities in an SAS can be the following.
Subject Activity Sequence Relationships
 SA1→SA2 denotes that for a subject S, activity in SA2 must be executed after
activity in SA1. For example, activity comment must follow activity edit:
SAedit→SAcomment
 SA1←SA2 denotes that for a subject S, activity in SA2 must be executed before
activity in SA1. For example, activity read must precede activity comment:
SAcomment←SAread
 SA1↔SA2 denotes that for a subject S, activity in SA2 and activity in SA1 are
mutually exclusive, and only one of the two activities will be processed. For
example, a medical diagnosis can be waiting for either to be approved or to be
edited and commented.
 SA1↕ SA2 denotes that for a subject S, activity in SA2 and activity in SA1 can be
processed simultaneously or in any order. For example, the object can be read
and redistributed at the same time.
So the relationship between two activities in an SAS can be, for example, that subject
activity comment has to be executed after subject activity edit.
Note: to make the notion clearer, multiple subjects are represented by SA, SB, SC etc.;
multiple objects are represented by Oα, Oβ, Oγ etc.; multiple subject activities are
represented by SA1, SA2, SA3 etc.
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Definition 2.5 (Duty): Duty is a collection of a subject, an object and the
subject's activities on the object. A duty D={(SA, SAS, Oα)}, indicates that a duty
of subject A requires access to object α for a set of activities.
A duty can be, for example, a medical staff member needs to read and append to a
patient’s healthcare record. The relationship between duties and roles is shown in
Figure 2.5. The circles denote different roles and the shaded parts belong to a duty. It
shows a duty not only contains roles (the roles are usually described by SAS), but
also contains a subject and the target object.
Figure 2.5: Duty and Roles
Definition 2.6 (Access Level): Access level indicates the importance of an object
or the rank (position) of a subject. In the proposed model, access levels are
represented by numeric values.
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Definition 2.7 (Subject Grade): Subject Grade (SG) is the subject's overall
access level.
A subject can access an object only when its SG is equal to or greater than the object
grade (definition 2.9).
Definition 2.8 (Object Granular Data): Object granular data (OGD) is partial
data. Every object can include a set of granular data {OαGDi| i = 1, 2,..., n},
where n is the number of granular data in object α.
An example of an object granular data is a paragraph in a document or a sentence in a
paragraph.
Definition 2.9 (Subject Sub-Grade): Subject Sub-Grade (SSG) is the subject's
access level for a piece of granular data of an object.
Each SG contains a set of Sub-grades (SSGs) indicating the access level to each piece
of granular data of the object. Each SSG contains an SAS indicating the execution
order of the subject activities.
Rule 2.1: If there is no SSG in a duty request, by default the SSG is set to the same
value as the SG of the subject, and different SSGs different from the same SG are
handled independently.
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Definition 2.10 (Object Grade): Object Grade (OG) is the minimum access level
for a subject to be able to access the object.
If SG ≥ OG, then access to the object is authorized, although access to some object
granular data (OGD) of this object may require a higher SSG.
Definition 2.11 (Object Sub-Grade): Object Sub-Grade (OSG) is the minimum
access level for a subject to be able to access a piece of granular data.
Each object (O) can have one or more pieces of object granular data (OGD). Each
OGD is optionally assigned an object sub-grade (OSG). If a piece of OGD is assigned
with an OSG, access is granted to this OGD only when the SSG for the ODG is equal
or greater than the OSG of the ODG. If an OGD is not assigned with an OSG, access
is granted to this OGD only when both SG is equal or greater than OG and SSG for
the OGD is equal or greater than the OG of this object. If there is an OGD, but no
OSG is associated with, the OGD uses OG as the access level. In addition, if there is
no SSG for such OGD, the subject access level for the OGD is by default equal to SG.
Rule 2.2: The access level of each object granular data OSGi must be no smaller than
the object grade OG. When a subject with SG ≥ OG is able to access an object, but
has no permission to any granular data in the object, i.e. SSGi < OSGi i , then
access will be granted only to the general information that is not assigned an OSG. .
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Definition 2.12 (Negative Permission): Negative Permission (NP) defines
operations that are not allowed to be executed on an object.
NP has the highest process priority in the proposed mechanism. An example of NP is
No edit permission for a certain piece of object granular data (OGD) unless SSG for
OGD is greater than θ (i.e. θ is the minimum access requirement).
Negative permissions are used only in the object privacy label which is handled by
the PPOC, and will be detailed in section 2.4.2.
Definition 2.13 (Special Condition): Special Condition (SC) defines conditions
that apply on an object or object granular data.
SP is processed after NP in the proposed mechanism. An example of SP is must sign
if edit.
In summary, a subject can access an object only when its SG is equal to or greater
than the object grade (see definition 2.9). Each SG contains a set of subject sub-
grades (SSGs) indicating the access levels to each piece of granular data of the object.
For each piece of object granular data, a set of SAS indicating the relationship of the
activities are attached. The relationship between SG, SSG and SAS is illustrated in
Figure 2.6.
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Subject Grade
Subject Subgrade 1 Subject Subgrade 2 Subject Subgrade 3
SAS 1 SAS 2 SAS 3
Subject
activity 1
Subject
activity 2
Subject
activity 3
Subject
activity 4
Subject
activity 5
Subject
activity 6
SA1 ↕SA2 SA3←SA4 SA5 ↔SA6
Figure 2.6: Hierarchical PSPC
The first part of Figure 2.6 shows subject sub-grade 1 (SSG1) for access to object
granular data 1, where the SSG1 is used for comparison with OSG1, and a subject
activity sequence 1 (SAS1) containing two subject activities SA1 and SA2. The activity
relationship is ‘processing in any order’. The other two parts indicate the activity
relationships are SA4 must be executed before SA3, and SA5 and SA6 are executed
mutually exclusive.
2.4 Diverse Privilege Controller of PPDAC
This section describes the privilege control module shown in Figure 2.4. The module
is composed of three functional components: privacy preserving subject privilege
control (PSPC), privacy preserving object control (PPOC), and privilege refinement
(PR). The PSPC component caters for granular privilege support and roaming user
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privilege adjustment, PPOC provides support for object conditions and special
requests, and adjustment of roaming data, and the PR component evaluates the
privileges of users against the requested objects. Apart from the above functional
components, roaming processes in cross-domain environments are also considered in
section 2.4.4, which helps to identify responsibility for privacy breach such as data
being redistributed without authorization. Before examining the first functional
component, the overall process flow of the diverse privilege controller is explained
with the help of Figure 2.7.
Privacy Preserving
Subject Privilege Control
(PSPC)
Privacy Preserving Object
Control (PPOC)
Privilege
Refinement
(PR)
Figure 2.7: Overall Process Flow of PPDAC on Granular Privilege
When a user submits a request, the PSPC module first checks the user's identity and
computes the proper permissions. For instance, a user requests a medical document
with read, edit, comment and redistribute privileges, but PSPC may ascertain that the
user is only allowed to have read and comment privileges on the destination object
server (explained in section 2.4.1). At the same time, the required document is
processed by PPOC, and a set of negative permissions (NPs) and special requests
(SPs) are attached according to the data owner’s preferences (further explained in
section 2.4.2). Finally, the privilege refinement module evaluates the permissions and
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assigns the final access rights (see section 2.4.3). When roaming into a foreign
domain, a user will first connect to the home subject server, which will communicate
with the foreign subject server to procure proper privilege constraints. If an object
needs to be copied to a foreign domain, a dynamic hierarchy is computed on the
destination object server. The roaming scenarios are discussed in section 2.4.4.
2.4.1 Privacy Preserving Subject Privilege Control (PSPC)
Component
The PSPC is explained via its three parts: PSPC process, hierarchical PSPC and
subject privacy label generator. The core PSPC defines the PSPC process flow that is
depicted in Figure 2.8. Hierarchical PSPC is responsible for putting forward subject
granular privilege candidates that are used by a label-based privilege system for
subject activity control. The subject privacy label generator encapsulates privilege
candidates that are derived from hierarchical PSPC into a privacy label and sends the
label to the Privilege Refinement component (See Figure 2.7).
Subject HierarchicalPSPC
Subject Privacy
Label Generator
Duty Request
Attributes
Assignment
Figure 2.8: PSPC Process
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There are three main elements defined in the PSPC process: subject (S, definition 2.1),
duty (D, definition 2.5), and subject privacy label (SPL) generator. A Subject is an
active participant, and a typical subject is a human user. Duty is defined in definition
2.5 and expressed by D={(S, SAS, O)}, which composes of a subject, subject activity
sequence and target objects. A subject privacy label (SPL) is a control frame
containing privilege candidates. In the PPDAC module, no negative permissions (see
definition 2.12) are assigned to an SPL.
The processing in PSPC starts with a subject submitting a duty request to the
hierarchical PSPC, which compiles the subject grade-subgrade hierarchy for the
subject and object involved, produces a list of privilege candidates, and sends it to the
subject privacy label generator.
The last part of the PSPC module is the subject privacy label generator. It takes
privilege candidates from the hierarchical PSPC and encapsulates them into a subject
privacy label (SPL) represented by equation (2-1), where i denotes the index of
required object granular data pieces and n is the number of requested object granular
data. The privilege candidates correspond to the subject activities that are evaluated
by the subject server. They will be used in the privilege refinement component
(section 2.4.3) to calculate proper permissions.
SPL={SG, SSGi, SSGi.SAS} , i∈ n (2-1)
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2.4.2 Privacy Preserving Object Control (PPOC) Component
The PPOC component implements label-based control for granular data in cross-
domain applications. PPOC is designed to cooperate with subject diverse privilege
control over granular objects. In this section, the three parts of PPOC are explained:
core PPOC, dynamic hierarchical control and object privacy label (OPL) generator.
The core PPOC works on granular data and defines the process flow of PPOC (see
Figure 2.9). There are three main elements defined in core PPOC: object (O,
definition 2.2), dynamic hierarchy, and object privacy label (OPL) generator. The
essential concepts are explained below , with some examples showing how they fit in
the core PPOC.
Figure 2.9: Core PPOC
Object here indicates the requested target, such as a file, a part of a file, data sheets or
several pieces of information for example date of birth, email address etc. Granular
object is a relative concept that refers to finer bits of the object. For instance,
compared with object ‘address:414-418 Swanston street, Melbourne VIC 3000’, the
granular ones can be ‘address: Street number: 414-418; Street name: Swanston; City:
Melbourne; State: Victoria; Post code: 3000’. The dynamic hierarchy module is the
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place where a requested object is assigned the privacy control codes, such as object
grade (OG), object sub-grade (OSG), negative permissions (NPs) and special
conditions (SCs). The OPL generator assembles all control codes into a privacy label.
The central module of PPOC is called Dynamic Hierarchy. It has two core functions:
hierarchy assignment (HA) and condition assignment (CA). Hierarchy assignment is
the process of OG and OSG assignment, and data transformation (i.e. masking or
perturbing original data. Perturbation algorithms are detailed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7).
Condition assignment attaches NPs and SCs to the object privacy label. Figure 2.10
illustrates an example of dynamic hierarchy with object grade, object sub-grade and
condition assignment.
Figure 2.10 Dynamic Hierarchy with HA and CA
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In the example, object sub-grade 1 indicates the access requirement of the first piece
of granular data. If a subject does not meet the grade required by the object, access
will be denied. Both OG and OSG are assigned by hierarchy assignment. ‘No edit
permission unless SSG1 is greater than θ’ is an example of an NP coming from
condition assignment. There is no SP in OSG1. In OSG2, ‘anyone who read this has to
sign’ is an SP indicating a mandatory requirement for a subject who wants to read this
piece of granular data.
With proper control assignments from Dynamic Hierarchy, all of these control codes
are encapsulated into an object privacy label (OPL). An OPL is a carrier of PPOC
control code shown in equation (2-2), where n denotes the number of required
granular data pieces in an object, and the numbers x and y depend on the object's
conditions.
OPL={OG, OSGi. OSGi.Ω(NP)x, OSGi.Ω(SP)y , i∈ n (2-2)
2.4.3 Privilege Refinement (PR) Component
After the derivation of a subject privacy label (SPL) from PSPC (section 2.4.1) and an
object privacy label (OPL) from PPOC (section 2.4.2), the final proper privileges of
the subject on the object are calculated in the Privilege Refinement (PR) component.
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Privilege Refinement (PR) introduces a structure to assist in defining and enforcing
rules of granular privilege control. It implements dual control of subject granular
privileges and object granular data.
Figure 2.11 shows that after both subject and object privacy labels are produced,
authorized privileges will be calculated by PR. The calculation has four steps. First a
validation check of both subject and object access levels, such as SG and OG, SSG1
and OSG1, is performed. It is followed by privilege refinement that derives proper
permissions for the required object. These steps are detailed below.
Subject Privacy
Label
Object Privacy
Label
Privilege Refinement
Grade Computing
Sub-grade Computing
NP, SC Processing
Activity Refinement
Figure 2.11: Privilege Refinement
Step 1: Grade computing
The subject grade (SG) in the subject privacy label (SPL) is represented by SPL.SG
and similarly, the object grade (OG) in the object privacy label (OPL) is OPL.OG. If
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SPL.SG is equal or greater than OPL.OG, PR will continue the refinement process,
otherwise access is denied.
Step 2: Sub grade computing
The subject sub-grade (SSG) in the SPL is represented by SPL.SSG and similarly for
the object sub-grade in OPL is OPL.OSG. Each object granular data (OGD) is
assigned an OSG and there is an SSG for access request. PR goes through each OGD
and compares the SSG and the OSG associated with it. If the SSG is equal or greater
than OSG, PR will continue processing, otherwise access to such object granular data
is denied. Even if access to a piece of granular data is denied, the decision will not
affect other sub-grade computing.
Step 3: Subject activity sequence computing
A subject activity sequence in the subject sub-grade is represented by SPL.SSGi.SAS,
where i refers to the index of object granular data (OGD) and j refers to an activity
such as read, add, remove etc. Object negative permission (NP) and special condition
(SC) are represented by OPL.OSGi.NP and OPL.OSGi.SC respectively, where i
indicates the index of OGD. For each OGD, the activities in OPL.OSG.NP will be
removed from the SPL.SSG.SAS. If the removed activity is in a sequence relationship,
the activities after it will not be executed. For example, if SAadd →SAsign and
OPL.OSG.NP is SAadd, then the SAsign will be not executed either. After processing
NP, object special condition (SC) will be added to the subject activity sequence. If the
subject fails to satisfy a special condition, the activities in the SC will not be executed.
For example, if a subject activity sequence is SAadd →SAsign and the OPL.OSG.SC is
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‘no add permission after 1st Feb’, then an add privilege request will be denied after
that date, and in the sequence SAsign will not be executed either.
Step 4: Execution of the refined privileges
If the access to an object and object granular data (OGD) is granted, the execution of
activities starts from the object’s general information, such as object identifier and the
information that is not assigned with OSG, then proceeds with each OGD.
This section explained how the subject privacy label and object privacy label help to
calculate the subject’s final proper permissions over the requested object, and the
solution for single domain environments was explained. The next section introduces
the scenario of cross-domain environments.
2.4.4 Subject Roaming and Object Roaming
This section starts with the concepts of subject roaming and object roaming. Then it
explains the roaming process in both PSPC and PPOC components. At last, three
different examples are provided to help understanding the roaming concepts. An
important feature of the solution is that the responsibilities are clearly identified.
Subject roaming happens when a subject leaves his own home domain and moves to
another domain where the subject does not have an account. Object roaming happens
when an object is required to be duplicated on another domain’s object server. During
object roaming, the subject’s home subject server is responsible for data sharing,
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whereas in subject roaming, the remote (foreign) subject server is. The roaming
process in PSPC and PPOC are explained in detail below.
First let us look at an example of hierarchical PSPC processing. Let us assume that
subject S submits a duty query D={S, SAS, O} to subject server SS, and the subject is
a valid user in the system, while O represents the required object. After receiving the
request, the subject server establishes (i) whether the request contains subject roaming
and (ii) whether the required object is stored on the home object server or on a remote
object server. Assume that the subject grade of S is SG and it has subject activities
allowed by the local subject server SS. If subject S does not require subject roaming,
the Hierarchical PSPC module will send SG and the subject activities to the privilege
refinement component (see section 2.4.3). If the request refers to an object that can
only be accessed on a remote server, subject roaming is needed. Let us assume
subject S, with home subject server SS, has no account on the remote subject server
RSS. If the roaming request is accepted by server RSS, it will generate a new subject
grade represented by R(SG) based on SG and an allowed activity set R(SA) in the RSS
is used instead of original SA. Subject roaming can be represented as SG(Foreign
Domain) = F [SG(Local Domain)]. Here function F denotes a mapping function that
is predetermined in each server based on the privacy level in each domain (in reality,
this may require experienced administration). Here a simple mapping function is used
only. Assume subject S in his home domain is assigned SG and in domain RSS, a
predetermined R(SG) is associated with subject S. Then for each subject sub-grade in
the RSS is calculated by SG
SGRSSGSSGR ii )()(  .
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When an object is required by a subject in the same domain, hierarchy assignment
(HA) produces the object's original OG and puts it into the OPL (see section 2.4.3),
while condition assignment (CA) puts negative permissions (NP) and special
conditions (SC) into the OPL. In a data roaming situation a remote server requires a
copy of object O, but the original OG and OSG may not be suitable for evaluation by
the remote server directly. Figure 2.12 shows the concept of HA applied adjustment.
In such cases, the home object server will first assign OG (from HA) and conditions
(from CA) to the object. Then the object will be sent to the remote object server,
where the Dynamic Hierarchy component will map OG into R(OG). This can be
represented as OG(Foreign Domain)=F [OG(Local Domain)]. The function F is a
mapping function that is predetermined in object servers and works in a similar way
to that of subject roaming. Finally, the object will be sent to the remote subject server
to satisfy the user’s request. In Figure 2.12, OG associated with object O is shown
with a list of OSGis that are the object sub-grades. When object O (including its
granular data) is created, it is associated with an OG. For instance, the object grade of
all data on an organization’s data server are determined based on the users in this
organization.
Figure 2.12: Data Roaming
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The following example illustrates object roaming. A researcher wants to access a
medical data sample that is only available on a remote server, on which the researcher
has no account. Also, the researcher’s home server has no right to create a temporary
account on the remote server. If the home server is eligible to acquire and store an
authorized copy on the home object server for a period of time, object roaming can
take place. The object roaming process can be expressed as follows, where n indicates
the total number of granular data.
In home servers: {OG (home Domain), OSGi(home Domain), Conditions}
In remote server: {OG(Foreign Domain), OSGi(Foreign Domain), Conditions}
Where OG (Foreign Domain)= F [OG(Local Domain)]
OSGi(Foreign Domain)={F(OSGi(home domain)) | i }
Next, the roaming process is discussed in three typical cases: (i) local user accessing
roaming objects, (ii) roaming user accessing remote objects on the home server and
(iii) roaming user accessing roaming objects.
Figure 2.13 shows that a user is trying to access an object stored on a remote object
server via the home server of the local user. For example, a doctor needs a document
from another hospital's data server but has no permission to access it directly. The
doctor has to access this file via his home hospital. Step (1) shows that the doctor
sends a request for a patient’s medical record O stored on a remote server. After the
doctor submits his request, the home hospital makes a request for object O to the
remote subject server. In step (3) the request has been accepted and in step (4) object
O is sent to the remote subject server and is ready for roaming. Steps (5) and (6) show
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that the home hospital has received a copy of object O and is available for access. In
this procedure, the home hospital has to be responsible for the copy of O.
Figure 2.13: Object Roaming .
Figure 2.14 shows the process when a user is roaming to a remote server and requires
an object stored on that server. For example, a doctor is invited to another hospital
and he needs to access data stored on the server of that hospital. The process of
subject roaming extends the basic local request by linking the home subject server to
a remote subject server i.e. in the visited hospital. The process is similar to object
roaming, but this time the data remains on the remote server, it does not propagate to
the doctor’s home hospital. In this procedure, the remote subject server has to be
responsible for the requested object O.
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Figure 2.14: Subject Roaming
Figure 2.15: Dual Roaming Request
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Figure 2.15 shows the process when a user S is roaming to a remote server RSA and
requires an object stored on another remote server RSB, and the data has to be
accessed via server RSA. For instance, a doctor is invited to a foreign hospital for a
certain period of time and needs a group of medical documents that are stored at
another data centre. The dual roaming request process is used in this case. Steps (1)
and (2) represent the doctor’s roaming privileges calculation, and in step (3) a request
is made to the remote object server RSB. This step is the same as step (2) in the object
roaming request process. Steps (4) and (5) represent encapsulation of the group of
medical documents' conditions, while step (6) is the data roaming process which is
the same as step (5) shown in Figure 2.13. Eventually, the roaming object is delivered
to remote server RSA. In this procedure, remote server RSA has to be responsible for
the copy of O.
2.5 Illustrating Examples and
Implementation
2.5.1 General Example
This section presents the demonstration of the proposed diverse privilege controller of
PPDAC in a simple medical environment. The two scenarios described are a normal
access request and a roaming request. The operational flow of the normal access
request is depicted in Figure 2.16. At first, users submit requests to the PSPC
component via a user interface. Then, the Hierarchical PSPC module calculates the
allowed privileges and produces a subject privacy label (SPL, section 2.4.1). In the
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PPOC component, the requested object is passed to the Dynamic Hierarchy, in which
hierarchy assignment (HA) and condition assignment (CA) take place (section 2.4.2).
After this, the allowed privileges and conditions are used for generating an object
privacy label (OPL). After both SPL and OPL have been generated, the labels are
passed on to the privilege refinement component to calculate the final proper
privileges.
Figure 2.16: Module and Component Diagram for The Implemented Scenario
Figure 2.17 shows how the proposed approach can be used to manage and share data
in a collaborative and cross-domain environment. The figure contains the
participating organizations (domains), Departments (sub domains), positions (roles)
and requests.
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In this example, it is assumed that all doctors, nurses and researchers are in the same
medical area of specialization. It is further assumed that doctors can work both in
medical and research departments, and they can work in other hospitals if needed (the
latter representing subject roaming). Nurses can only work in medical departments
and in their home hospitals. Researchers can be contractors or university students, and
they can only work in research departments. Researchers can ‘roam’ to other
hospitals’ research departments only if accompanied by their supervising doctor.
Figure 2.17: A Scenario for A Hospital System
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2.5.2 Specific Examples
To help understanding of the proposed model, this section describes a medical
example, including the involved parties (domains), participants (subjects and objects),
code base (privilege table and roaming rules) and individual cases that illustrate how
the proposed model works.
There are three parties involved and shown in the Figure 2.18. Each party is an
organization, and represents an individual domain which contains its own subject
server and object server. Assume that organization A is a small regional healthcare
clinic, organization B is a national level healthcare center and organization C is a
national healthcare data repository and research center. Users in organization A
cannot directly access data stored in organization C but have to request it via
organization B.
Organization B (Domain B)Organization A (Domain A)
Subject
Server A
Object
Server A
Subject
Server B
Subject
Server C
Object
Server B
Object
Server C
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Figure 2.18: Illustrating Example
In this section, assume there are five kind of participants, which are:
 ICT support (IS): IT support and management for the organizations
 Specialist (S): Specialist for certain category of disease.
 General practitioner (GP): general doctors
 Nurse (N): staff who collect patients’ data and input data to the system but do not
make any diagnosis.
 Head-Nurse (HN): leader of nurses in healthcare organizations
The rules for three organizations are shown in figures below.
Subject grades
Subject roles Subject grades
Specialist SG=9
GP SG=8
Head-nurse SG=7
Nurse SG=6
ICT support SG=5
Figure 2.19: Subject Grades
Object grades
Object category Object grades and sub-grades
General information in a patient’s record OG=5
Medical record field in a patient’s record OSG=7
Figure 2.20: Object Grades
Activity list for the three organizations
Activity Explanation
read Read the specified granular data
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add Add information to the granular data. Note: this
activity does not allow to remove information
remove Delete information from granular data. Note: this
activity does not allow to add information
edit Add and remove information of granular data
comment Comment to granular data. Note: this activity does
not allow editing original granular data.
sign Sign an object or certain part of an object. This
activity is used when someone approves or
acknowledges something
distribute Distribute to other domains’ subjects
manage Manage the object
Figure 2.21: Activity List For The Three Organizations
Roaming rules
Roaming option Roaming adjustment rules
DomainA.subject S roams to DomainB The subject’s SG decreases by 1 when
the subject is roaming to domain B
DomainC.objectS roams to DomainB The object’s OG increases by 1 when
objects in domain C roam to domain B
Negative permissions are edit,
distribution, manage when objects in
domain C roam to domain B.
Special condition is comment and sign
after all activities
Figure 2.22: Roaming Rules
Case 1: Assume DomainB.subject is a specialist, who wants to update a patient’s
medical record object O that is stored in domain B as well. The specialist sends a duty
request to subject server B which is D={DomainB.subject, edit, DomainB.object}.
CHAPTER 2 ACCESS CONTROL IN CROSS-DOMAIN ENVIRONMENTS
68
The subject server checks and confirms that the DomainB.subject is a specialist and
sets the DomainB.Subject.SG to 9.
The object server has set the DomainB.object.OG to 5 and the medical record field of
the patient’s record to 7 according to the system rules. In addition, the object server
requires confirmation by the person updating the medical record, which is represented
as DomainB.object.SP=sign. As the medical record can not be deleted,
DomainB.object.NP = remove.
The subject label is SPL = {SG = 9, SSG=9, SSG.SAedit} and the object label is OPL
= {OG=5, OSG=7,OSG.NP = remove, OSG.SP=sign}. The privilege refinement
process is:
i) Compare SG and OG. Because SG is greater than OG, the subject is allowed to
access the record’s general information, such as the record’s identity (Note: not
the patient’s identity).
ii) Compare SSG and OSG. Because no specific SSG is assigned to the specialist,
then the assigned SSG is equal to the value of SG. As SSG is greater than OSG,
access is granted and privileges need to be refined.
iii) The subject request is SSG.SAedit (updating the record), which means the
specialist requests edit privilege for the granular data medical record. As the
OSG.NP is remove, it means no delete privilege is granted for this data item.
Thus, the remaining privilege is add because edit contains add and remove.
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iv) The object contains OSG.SP=sign, which means a confirmation of the specialist
is required after operation add.
v) Thus the refined privilege will be SAadd→SAsign for the medical record.
Case 2 (dual roaming): Assume DomainA.subject is a GP, who is asked to diagnose
a patient at the patient’s home. The GP needs extra information about the patient and
the information is stored in domain C, represented by DomainC.object. The GP has
no direct access permit to the domain C and has to require the object via domain B.
The roaming processing steps are as follows.
 The GP sends a duty request to the subject server A which is
D={DomainA.subject, read, DomainC.object}.
 The subject server sees that the DomainC.object cannot be accessed directly and
has to be accessed via domain B. The subject privacy label sent from domain A to
domain B is SPL={SG=9,SSG=9, SSG.SAread}. By applying the roaming rules
specified in Figure 2.22, the roaming subject privacy label R(SPL) is set to
{DomainA.subject.SG=8, SSG=8, SSG.SAread}.
 As domain B has to obtain the patient’s record from domain C, object roaming is
required as well. The roaming object privacy label R(OPL) is
{DomainC.object.OG=6, OSG=8, OSG.NP=edit, distribution, manage,
OSG.SP=comment, sign}.
Then by adopting the above five step procedure from i) to v), the refined privileges
are SAcommnet→SAsign.
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2.5.3 Implementation
The diverse privilege controller of PPDAC model was written in Java 1.6. Figure 2.23
shows the object server loading an XML file and processing it for the incoming
request from the subject server. Binary code is used in the example, which represents
subject activities read, edit ,add, delete, comment, declare, replicate and manage;
binary 1 indicates the represented activity is allowed while binary 0 indicates the
represented activity is prohibited. Permission binary code 11001010 in this example
allowing read, edit, comment and replicate but not other operations on the required
target.
Figure 2.24 shows a simple subject server monitoring window. It shows the subject’s
ID, required data and the subject’s basic control codes.
Figure 2.23 The Object Server Demo
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Figure 2.24: The Subject Server Demo
Figure 2.24 demonstrates the subject server which sends a request for an object. It
also shows the permission allowed for the second granular data which is called
granular data 2. The text area displays the outputs of the subject server.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Comparison with Existing Solutions
In Table 2.1, User diversity denotes the capability to support large number of unique
subjects, roaming/reorganization is the capability of supporting subjects in multiple
roles or changing position/job. Diverse privilege extensible refers to the mechanism
of supporting personalized privileges for special environments. The term granular
data levels indicates the capability of individual granular data access control: full
support means flexibility to adjust granular data access levels as required, while
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partial support means that either the granular data structure is fixed or cannot be
adjusted to different application scenarios. The feature dynamic data access levels
denotes the capability of supporting variable access levels in diverse data sharing
environments: full support means that the data access level can be set as required and
can be adjusted to a remote domain while partial support means only one, the former
or the latter is supported. The term cross-domain environments denotes roaming-
enabled features of the mechanism and the capability of identifying the responsible
party when an access event happens in a cross-domain environment. Full support
means an approach adjustable for diverse application scenarios including subject
roaming and object roaming, and a clearly identifiable server responsible for
enforcing data access restrictions. Partial support means any of object roaming,
subject roaming or identification of access management responsibilities is supported,
but not all of them.
Table 2.1: Features Comparison
HASBE
[42]
RMAMD
[212]
Proposed
Solution
1. Subject privilege
- User diversity
- Roaming/reorganization
- Diverse privilege extensible
Full Support
Not Available
Partial Support
Partial Support
Partial Support
Not Available
Full Support
Full Support
Full Support
2. Granular data
- Granular data levels Partial Support Not Available Full Support
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- Dynamic data access levels Partial Support Not Available Full Support
3. Cross-domain environments Partial Support Partial Support Full Support
HASBE [42] combines attribute-based solutions [202] and hierarchical access control
[230] to support user hierarchy and unique users with diverse privileges. The model
does not support access conditions and privilege relationships or constraints, such as
‘no privilege edit is granted for roaming users’. Also, for granular data management,
the model in [42] lacks in support of access levels of granular data and conditions of
granular data. Roaming is partially supported, which is benefited from the user
hierarchy model, but the way the roaming process works was not clearly discussed in
the paper. In addition, data roaming is not supported by the model [42].
RMAMD [212] proposed an enhanced roaming table mechanism. It built mapping
links between roles in different domains. Once a domain in the path of a mapping link
is not available, roaming is disabled. Roaming users are unique, lack support of
conditions (also used as user attributes) and fixed roaming tables are not able to
satisfy roaming needs. The following example illustrates the shortcomings of
RHAMD. A marketing team leader in the home domain has privilege pr1, pr2 and pr3.
When required to roam to an other department twice, for the first time the subject
requires privilege pr1 and pr4 and for the second time he requires privilege pr1 and
pr2, but all required privileges are denied due to a special condition, so only pr5 is
granted. In this case, the RMAMD is not able to deal with the request.
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The limitation of the proposed model includes its requiring a properly managed level-
based system as the model highly relies on appropriate administration of subject and
object levels.
2.7 Summary
The focus of this chapter was on data access control using both diverse privileges and
granular data in cross-domain environments. A mechanism for combined subject
granular privilege control and object granular data access control was proposed, and
the issues of cross-domain data sharing environments were also addressed.
The proposed method addressed the problems of access control of unique users with
diverse privileges in cross-domain environments.
The proposed model enables large amount of unique users, which makes the model
more practical for large organizations. The support of diverse privileges brings more
flexibility of management to access control and a dual control mechanism,
hierarchical user attributes and hierarchical object attributes, offers better access
management for fine-grained granular data. In addition, the user activity sequence
and multiple conditions gives more power of control over work flows.
In cross-domain scenarios, full support of dual roaming is embedded in the proposed
model. It enables user roaming, data roaming and privilege adjustment. The model
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maps roles in one domain into roles in another domain, and thereby avoids the need
of an additional role assignment when a subject roams into another domain. A clear
responsibility of access enforcement in cross-domain application can be identified,
which helps when dispute occurs.
The main advantages of the proposed mechanism are in it supporting diverse user
privileges and accommodating application conditions in both single-domain and
cross-domain environments. The object server can control granular data access with
cooperating subject servers. With the subject and object roaming mechanisms, both
user and data re-deployment are properly handled. Furthermore, the proposed method
clearly defines the responsibility for data management in a multiple domain
environment.
The next chapter (chapter 3) turns the focus on the purpose of access when requests
lodged.
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Chapter 3
Purpose-based PPDAC
The previous chapter introduced a privacy preserving data access control model
(PPDAC) that addressed the issue of unique users with diverse privileges in
cross-domain environments. This chapter examines another perspective of privacy
preserving access control. It deals with the purpose of accessing target data and how
the requested data is intended to be used, and presents a solution to enhance the
PPDAC model in terms of purpose translation and adjustability.
3.1 Introduction
To maintain proper data privacy, traditional access control methods that only focus on
privilege management are not sufficient. Byun emphasized that privacy protection
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cannot be fully achieved by traditional access control mechanisms mainly for two
reasons: i) traditional access control models focus on subjects’ privileges on objects,
while privacy requirements are also concerned with the purpose an object is used for
and ii) the comfort level of data usage varies from individual to individual [116].
Meanwhile, Yang et al. pointed out that a privacy requirement ensures that data can
only be used for its intended purpose and an access purpose is compliant with the
data’s intended purpose [117].
To enhance privilege control methods to consider purpose, a method called
purpose-based access control was proposed [116, 122] and then widely adopted and
extended [50, 97-99, 118-128, 130]. The original purpose-based access control
(PBAC) built a bridge between role-based access control (RBAC) and subject
intentions. Later works enhanced PBAC with conditional roles, obligations, usage,
purpose hierarchy and purpose process [39, 99, 116-127]. However, purposes heavily
depend on users, application domains and environments. The meaning of a subject's
purpose can relate to different user operations and may lead to distinct privileges in
cross-domain environments, and ignoring such issues can cause privilege conflicts.
This chapter enhances the PPDAC model detailed in the previous chapter by adding a
privilege-oriented purpose-based access control module. It includes an improved
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PSPC component (section 2.4.1) that integrates PPDAC principles, a multiple
attribute-based object control component and a privacy preserving privilege
refinement component. The main contributions are that the enhanced PPDAC model
enables an access control incorporating both subject and object control, fills the gap
between purpose and privilege control in cross-domain environments, and thereby
enables the use of purposes for granular data and purpose translation in cross-domain
environments. Moreover, the chapter designs a hybrid access control approach which
enables flexible control for large organizations.
3.1.1 Chapter outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews existing privacy
preserving methods that focus on purpose. Section 3.3 presents preliminary concepts
on purpose-based theory that will be used in this chapter. Section 3.4 proposes a
privilege-oriented purpose-based module for the PPDAC model. The verification of
the proposed PPDAC model is presented in section 3.5. This is followed by section
3.6, which shows an example of the proposed module. Section 3.7 discusses the
advantages of the proposed method and then the chapter is summarized in section 3.8.
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3.2 Background
Role-based privilege control and purpose-based control are key concepts in access
control assignment as they address two main aspects of privacy policies: who can
access the target and with what privileges, and for what purpose. The former was
discussed in the previous chapter, and the latter is examined in this chapter. In this
section, existing approaches that consider purpose in access control systems are
reviewed.
Purpose is one of the most essential components of privacy-preserving access control,
and is a central concept in privacy protecting access control models [100, 125]. A
formal purpose-based model (PBAC) was proposed in 2005 by Byun and Li [116]. In
[116, 117], purposes are classified into two categories that are widely adopted in
many other solutions as well [118-130]: intended purposes (IPs) and access purposes
(APs). Intended purposes are purposes associated with data and express the data
owners’ wish. Access purposes refer to the way the accessor wants to use a certain
object. The PBAC model builds on these purpose principles. When a user submits a
request, the access control system verifies whether the APs complies with the IPs of
the requested data object: permits access if it does, otherwise denies the request. The
key feature of PBAC is that it supports explicit prohibitions and organizes purposes in
a hierarchical structure. Moreover, granular data object administration can be
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achieved via associating IPs with a data object, which can be a whole table, a column
in a table or a tuple in a table. Figure 3.1 shows an instance of a hierarchical purpose
and Figure 3.2 shows an example of how PBAC extends RBAC [118].
Figure 3.1: An Example of Hierarchical Purpose [118]
Figure 3.2: An Example of PBAC Roles [118]
To improve the PBAC model by incorporating existing RBAC models, the authors of
[116] extended their own work and presented an improved the PBAC model with
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extra control on IPs [118]. It divided IPs into strong IPs (sIPs) that cannot be
overridden and weak IPs (wIPs) that can be overridden, thereby giving more
flexibility to purpose control. Similarly, the authors of [117] extended their previous
work to improve management by a process flow control mechanism over IPs [122].
There is also a large volume of literature on improving PBAC in relation to purpose
management. In [121], the authors added purpose extension [131] to PBAC in order
to enhance purpose control. In [123], PBAC’s purposes are declared explicitly by the
users themselves. The key feature of this approach is that the user purpose is
determined in a dynamic manner, based on subject attributes, context attributes and
authorization policies, but the solutions lacks support of object related attributes. In
[124], the key feature is supporting prohibitions specifying that some data cannot be
used for certain purposes. The approach in [125] is designed for a variety of purposes,
including conditional purposes. The authors of [127] proposed a conditional role
model based on PBAC, where users dynamically activate conditional roles that are
associated with purposes. Another work [50] explores the connection between
permissions and roles with respect to purposes. Also, the author points that out a
subject should specifically assert the purpose of accessing data in a request. The
method presented in [50] directly assigns purpose to subject roles and employs two
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components: server constraints determination and subject obligation determination.
By using these components, conditions are also considered in the approach.
In addition to purpose management improvements, purpose translation is also
discussed in the literature. In [119], the author proposes a personal information flow
model that specifies a limited number of subject activities on each type of information.
An alternative to intended purposes is proposed in [120]: the authors map each
subject to a sequence of activities with personally identifiable information, in order to
ensure such information is used solely for the intended purpose.
In summary, existing solutions explore purpose management and the connection
between purpose and subject activities. To further look into purpose-based access
control, two issues have to be addressed and yet have been overlooked. (i) Purposes
are not only associated with subjects, but the object side also needs to be considered.
In addition to the object owner’s wish (IP), data type and other data related attributes
can affect IPs as well. (ii) Purpose heavily depends on users, application domains and
environments. The meaning of a subject's purpose can be translated to other user
operations and may lead to varied privileges in different environments.
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3.3 Privilege-oriented Purpose-based
PPDAC
This section first presents a privacy preserving data access control (PPDAC) model.
After a general description, it focuses on a PPDAC functional component named
privilege-oriented purpose-based module (Figure 2.4). Using this module, the
complete PPDAC model is proposed. Also in this section, basic concepts and notation
relating to this chapter are introduced and explained.
The model shown in Figure 2.4 depicts two main components that realize the
proposed system, namely the subject server and the object server. Each component
has two main function modules: granular privilege control and purpose-based control.
In chapter 2, the granular privilege control modules were discussed; this chapter
focuses on the purpose-based access control modules.
3.3.1 Basic Concepts and Notation
This section starts by introducing definitions and notation for the purpose-based
module. For clarification, the essential concepts will also be explained where they are
used in this chapter.
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Definition 3.1 (Subject purpose): Subject purpose (SP) is the purpose
associated with an activity sequence of a subject, and it indicates what the
subject intends to use the object for after gaining access.
SP is composed of subject main purpose (SMP) and subject special purpose (SSP).
SMP indicates the overall aim of the subject while SSP relates to certain granular data.
For each SMP, there can be none, one or more SSPs, that is, SSP does not have to be
provided when the subject lodges a request. SSP and SMP are related concepts. SSP,
compared with SMP, refers to some detail of the requested granular object. An
example is as follows. In a building some unknown chemical material is reported to
be leaking. Investigators’ SMP can be “want to know chemical materials used in this
building”. The requested documents contain information about the building, including
chemical materials, building structure, management summaries, business related
information, customer information and other, restricted information. By default, only
the granular data about the chemical materials will be disclosed to the investigators,
as that matches the SMP. An investigator may request access to another piece of
granular data “building structure” for the purpose of “evacuation”. This is an SSP and
is optional, as if there is no one in the building, this granular data will not be needed.
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Definition 3.2 (Subject Obligation): Subject obligation (SO) is a subject role
related constraint.
Subject obligation is assigned to a subject based on the subject role. An example of a
subject obligation is “for marketing manager, the document marketing report must be
signed if no more addition is required from marketing team”.
Definition 3.3 (Subject Server Constraint): Subject server constraint (SC)
consists of subject server related access conditions, represented as a sequence of
subject activities that must or must not be performed before or during an access.
Subject server constraints are assigned to a subject according to the subject server’s
conditions. An example of SC is “access are denied for all incoming requests after 5
pm”(which may be due to scheduled maintenance or other special events).
Definition 3.4 (Object purpose): Object purpose (OP) represents the object
owner’s wish regarding valid and invalid use of the object.
There are two mutually exclusive categories, allowed object purposes (AOP) and
prohibited object purposes (POP). AOP denotes the only purposes that are allowed
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for an object while POP denotes the only purposes that are prohibited for an object.
An example of AOP is “read permission for all employees in the company, edit
permission for employees in the marketing department”. An example of POP is “no
data roaming to other departments or other organizations”.
Definition 3.5 (Object obligation): An object obligation (OO) is a sequence of
subject activities on an object that must or must not be conducted before, during
or after an access.
Object obligation is generated by the object server according to the object server
access conditions. An example of OO is “subjects who edit the object must sign a
declaration form”.
Definition 3.6 (Object Type): Object type (OT) describes an object’s usage
called category, and related temporal and organizational constraints called
object category specifications.
Category and specification are used for imposing object constraints. An example of
OT is “2012 Q1 Marketing report” where “report” is the object’s category, “2012”,
“Q1” and “marketing” are specifications. An OT is associated with one object, and
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can contain more than one categories, and more than one specification can be
assigned to each usage category.
An example constraint can be "files in sub-domain X" can only be accessed via
sub-domain X. On one hand, object purpose (OP) denotes the owner's wish or
requirement applying to those who want to access it, on the other hand, object
obligation (OO) describes the object server's requirements. The object privacy label
(OPL) used in section 2.4.2 is extended, by adding purposes, obligations and
constraints.
3.4. Privilege-Oriented Purpose-Based
Module
This module is designed to enable a purpose-based mechanism in the proposed
PPDAC model. This section extends the functions of the three main components
discussed in chapter 2, which are privacy preserving subject privilege control (PSPC),
privacy preserving object control (PPOC) and privilege refinement (PR).
The module shown in Figure 3.3 consists of three functional components which are
subject-based access control (SBAC), object-based access control (OBAC) and
privilege refinement (PR). SBAC is extended from PSPC (chapter 2.4.1) and caters
CHAPTER 3 PURPOSE-BASED PPDAC
88
for subject purposes, subject obligations and subject server constraints, OBAC is
extended from PPOC (chapter 2.4.2) and provides support for object types,
obligations and object purpose. PR determines the most appropriate privileges for
users with regards to the given purpose. In Figure 3.3, SPL indicates the subject
privacy label and OPL denotes the object privacy label, which will be introduced in
sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, respectively.
Privilege-Oriented Purpose-Based Module
Privilege
Refinement
Subject-Based
Access Control
Object-Based
Access Control
SPL
OPL
User
request
Refined
privileges
Figure 3.3: Privilege-Oriented Purpose-Based Module
The privilege-oriented purpose-based module (Figure 3.3) processes user requests.
For each request, SBAC generates an SPL which gives all subject-based access
control codes; while for the OBAC, OPL is generated that contains all access control
codes regarding the object. Then, both SPL and OPL are forwarded to the PR
component and permitted privileges are derived.
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3.4.1 Subject-based Access Control (SBAC)
SBAC has three layers (Figure 3.4): subject attributes assignment (SAA), subject
privilege interpretation (SPI) and subject privacy label generation (SPLG).
The SAA layer derives subject role from the subject server’s database, extracts the
subject’s purposes from user requests and obtains subject server constraints from the
subject server (section 3.4.1.1). The SPI layer translates the attributes in SAA layer
into subject activity sequence (SAS, definition 2.5) and adjusts the translations
depending on different domains (section 3.4.1.2). The SPLG layer encapsulates all
subject-based control codes into a subject privacy label (SPL, introduced in chapter 2).
The detailed contents and functions of the three layers are presented later in the
sections below.
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Figure 3.4: The Three-Layer Subject-Based Access Control (SBAC) Component
3.4.1.1 Subject Attributes Assignment (SAA) Layer
The SAA layer has three functions: subject role assignment (RA), subject purpose
assignment (SPA) and subject constraint assignment (SCA).
RA is a functional unit dealing with Hierarchical PSPC processes. It receives subject
role from the subject server’s user authentication database and obtains subject grade
CHAPTER 3 PURPOSE-BASED PPDAC
91
(SG, definition 2.6), subject sub-grades (SSG, definition 2.8) and subject obligation
(SO, definition 3.2) from an organization’s policy database. The SG and SSG will be
sent directly to the SPLG layer, while the SO will be passed on to the SPI layer for
further processing (Figure 3.4).
SPA extracts the subject purpose (SP, definition 3.1) hierarchy from the subject
request, which contains subject main purpose (SMP, see explanation of definition 3.1)
and subject special purpose (SSP, see explanation of definition 3.1). The SMP and
SSP will be forwarded to the SPI layer for further processing.
SCA obtains the subject server constraints (SC, definition 3.3) from the subject server.
The SC will be sent to the SPI layer together with SMP, SSP SO for translation.
The RA, SPA and SCA together to form a whole subject-based access control
foundation. Each of them represents one factor that affects the access results. RA
represents administrative control in an organization, such as the human resource
department or the role management team; SPA represents the needs of subjects to
perform their work and SCA represents constraints from the subject server. The
designation of this three functional control units is provides subject-based three
dimensional control, by considering the organizational environment that assigns roles,
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the access request originator’s aim (subject purpose) and server constraints (e.g. time
restrictions).
3.4.1.2 Subject Privilege Interpretation (SPI) Layer
The subject privilege interpretation (SPI) layer translates subject purposes (SP),
subject obligations (SO) and subject server constraints (SC) to subject activity
sequences (SAS) (Figure 3.5). The translation process is described below.
A purpose hierarchy containing SMP and SSP is translated to an SAS representing the
requested subject activities on the target object. The translation result depends on
organizational access purpose policies and the results can vary due to varying policies
in different organizations (domains). For example, the main purpose “prepare report
for distribution” and the target object “customer data” can be translated to “read all
fields of customer data” in one domain, while in another it may be translated to “read
customer age, gender only”. Such variation can happen due to data content or policy
diversity.
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Figure 3.5 SPI Layer
Subject obligation (SO) needs to be translated when the subject moves to another
domain (roaming). This translation is performed on the subject server the subject
sends the request to. When roaming (presented in chapter 2), all associated subject
servers’ SO will be attached to the subject. For instance, when a technician in domain
DA roams to domain DB, DA gives subject obligation “add report” and DB gives
subject obligation “roaming technicians can only read object granular data (OGD)
titled maintenance manual”. Then both obligations will be translated to activity
sequence “SAadd Oreport” and “SAread OGDmaint”.
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Subject constraint (SC) can take different forms, such as “no access request is
accepted after 5pm” due to server maintenance or “no distribution” due to company
policies regardless of the subject roles. These constraints will be translated to an SAS
as well.
To instantiate the model, expression syntax can be used. To help understanding the
model, let us use a simple syntax and explain it in an example. A request expression
"subject S requests to do marketing through the file repository Repo" needs to be
converted to formal language; such as "<subject S> check <file> existence {and}
read <profile section> {with the purpose of} [marketing]" clearly specifies the
subject’s activities. In this example,
 < > indicate the subject or object in a request,
 { } indicate built-in conditions or logical expressions, such as “and”, “or”,
“with”,
 [ ] indicate purposes,
 italics denote activities
The main function of the SPI layer is to convert subject purposes, obligations and
constraints into subject activity sequences that can be directly controlled by the model.
Such translation can be managed via domain-based purpose-activity mapping tables,
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such as that shown in Table 3.1. Using “main purpose is marketing” as the example,
the activity sequence is SiAcheck→[(SiAread→ SiAdeliver) ↔ (SiAfinish→ SiAreport)] {and}
{time=10am to 3pm} which means for the subject i, the subject activity sequence is
first check the condition whether the access time is between 10am and 3pm. If the
condition is satisfied, then check availability of the requested object. If this object is
available, then either perform “read the object and then deliver it” or “finish updating
and then report to manager”.
In summary, the SPI layer takes subject purposes, subject obligations and subject
server constraints to build a connection between subject requests and subject activity
sequences. It translates the subject’s request into a policy-manageable syntax.
Moreover, it provides manageable privilege control elements for the next layer: the
subject privacy label generation (SPLG) layer.
Table 3.1: Sample Activities Mapping Table
Acts Description of requests and purposes Associated activities
A Preparing quarterly report for general manager Read, copy, comment, sign
B Prepare report for division manager Read, edit
C Marketing List, read
D Case study List, read, log
CHAPTER 3 PURPOSE-BASED PPDAC
96
3.4.1.3 Subject Privacy Label Generation (SPLG) Layer
Subject privacy label generation (SPLG) is an extension of the subject privacy label
(SPL) component in chapter 2, to encapsulate the subject grade, sub-grade, SP
activity sequence, SO activity sequence and SC activity sequence into a single subject
privacy label (SPL).
A typical SPL has the form <domain.subject, domain.subject.role,
domain.subject.purpose, domain.subject.SG, domain.subject.SSG, domain.subject.SP.
SAS, domain.subject.SO.SAS, domain.subject.SC.SAS>, where
 domain.subject indicates the domain where the subject is located. This attribute
affects subject obligations, subject grade, object purposes and object obligations.
 domain.subject.role indicates the role assigned to the subject. This attribute
affects subject grade, subject sub-grade, subject obligations and object
obligations.
 domain.subject.purpose is the purpose of the subject.
 domain.subject.SG, SSG are access level attributes (subject grade and subject
sub-grade) that are needed for privilege refinement and authorization.
 domain.subject.SP.SAS denotes the subject activity sequence translated from the
subject purpose.
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 domain.subject.SO.SAS denotes the subject activity sequence translated from the
subject obligation.
 domain.subject.SC.SAS denotes the subject activity sequence translated from the
subject server’s constraints.
3.4.2 Object-Based Access Control (OBAC)
The OBAC component implements object purpose-based access control. It supports
object purpose (definition 3.4), object obligation (definition 3.5), object type
(definition 3.6) and fine-grained object granularity (OGD, definition 2.7).
The OBAC consists of three processing layers: object attributes assignment (OAA)
layer, object privilege interpretation (OPI) layer and object privacy label generation
(OPLG) layer as shown in Figure 3.6.
The OAA layer obtains the object owner’s intension, stored int he form of object
purpose (OP), object type (OT) and object obligation (OO), from the object server.
These attributes will be then sent to the OPI layer and translated into activity
sequences. These activity sequences will be passed on to the OPLG layer.
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Figure 3.6 Object-Based Access Control
3.4.2.1 Object Attribute Assignment (OAA) Layer
The OAA layer caters for three attributes shown in Figure 3.6: object purpose (OP,
definition 3.4), object type (OT, definition 3.6), and object obligation (OO, definition
3.5).
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OP is dealt with by the functional unit object purpose assignment (OPA). Object
purpose represents the object owner’s intension regarding what the object can be used
for. It is either allowed object purpose (AOP) or prohibited object purpose (POP).
The purpose will be sent to the OPI layer for processing.
Object type assignment (OTA) deals with object types (OT) representing temporal and
organizational constraints. OT is composed of category and specifications that are
usually set by the object server or the owner. For example, an OT can be quarterly
report, where report is the object category and quarterly is a specification qualifier of
the report. The specification may be used to limit the object purpose and obligations
based on privacy policies and management rules, such as a quarterly report can be
updated within a week after it was submitted, and after such time the file will be
automatically locked and will be set to read only. Also, it is possible to add extra
specifications to the object, such as organizational attributes, e.g. marketing quarterly
report, so that the key specification marketing affects object purpose and obligations,
and in other departments only managers or above can access the marketing quarterly
report.
The function unit object obligation assignment (OOA) deals with object obligations
(OO) representing the constraints from the object server. These constraints are
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different to those provided by OP and OT. The constraints brought by OO may not
apply to a specific object only. For example, an OO ‘subjects who edit the object
must sign a declaration form’ can be a requirement for all objects.
OPA, OTA and OOA together form a holistic foundation of object-based access
control, each of them represents one factor that affects the access of objects. OPA
expresses access limitation by the object owner; OTA indicates inherent limitation of
the data while OOA focuses on constraints other than OPA and OTA. The access
limitations will then be forwarded to the OPI layer for translation.
Compared with PPOC (section 2.4.2), the major feature of the OAA layer is
structuring object attributes into a hierarchy to facilitate the definition and
administration of object purposes and obligations. For example, in an organization,
managers handle data types and obligations, while data owners set object purposes.
3.4.2.2 Object Privilege Interpretation (OPI) Layer
The object privilege interpretation (OPI) layer translates object purposes (OP), object
type (OT) and object obligation (OO) to a subject activity sequence (SAS) (Figure
3.7).
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OT activity
sequence
OO activity
sequence
Figure 3.7: OPI Layer
Object purpose contains either allowed (AOP) or prohibited purposes (POP) that will
be translated to SAS representing the owner’s intension on what the object can be or
cannot be used for.
Both OT elements, category and specifications, will be translated depending on the
organization’s data classification policy that can change with time. For example, the
old policy states “marketing report can be accessed by marketing department only”
and after a new department being set up, the new policy can be “marketing report can
be accessed by marketing department and customer service department only”. In this
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example, although the OT remains the same, the translation has to be changed
according to the updated policy.
The translation of OO is similar to that of subject constraints (SC). These three
attributes OP, OT and OO will be translated into an activity sequence (SAS) in the
OPI layer and then be passed on to the OPLG layer.
3.4.2.3 Object Privacy Label Generation (OPLG) Layer
The object privacy label generation (OPLG) layer encapsulates the output of the OPI
layer into an object privacy label (OPL) and sends it to the privilege refinement
component (section 3.4.3).
A typical OPL has the form <domain.object, domain.object.OG, domain.object.OSG,
domain.object.OP.SAS, domain.object.OT.SAS, domain.object.OO.SAS>, where
 domain.object indicates the domain where the object is stored. This attribute
affects object constrained privileges and OG, as each domain has its own policies
that can constrain objects and pre-determined object grade.
 domain.object.OG and OSGx are access control attributes needed for privilege
refinement that were discussed in chapter 2.
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 domain.object.OP.SAS denotes an activity sequence associated with either
allowed or prohibited object purposes.
 domain.object.OT.SAS relates to object category and specification. This attribute
affects the object grade (OG) and object sub-grade (OSG), as different data types
can be assigned pre-determined object grades, object sub-grades (for granular
data) and access conditions.
 Domain.object.OO.SAS denotes the translation of object obligations into an
activity sequence.
3.4.3 Privilege Refinement (PR)
Privileges that allow subjects to perform activities are refined in four steps, as shown
in Figure 3.8. Each step deals with one or more subject and object attributes and
passes the results on to the next step.
Step (1) deals with the highest priority attributes: subject grade (SG), object grade
(OG), subject main purpose (SMP) and allowed object purpose (AOP)/prohibited
object purpose (POP). The evaluation of SG and OG was detailed in section 2.4.3.
For SMP, the following rule applies.
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Rule 3.1: Subject main purpose (SMP) is allowed only when SMP is an allowed
object purpose (AOP) or SMP is not a prohibited purpose (POP).
If SMP satisfies rule 3.1 and SG passes the algorithm detailed in section 2.4.3, the
process moves to step (2). Otherwise, access is denied.
SG and OG
Purposes
(1)Subject grade (SG)
Subject main
purposes (SMP)
Object grade (OG)
Object purposes
(OP)
Passed
Passed
Subject constraints
Subject obligations
Object obligations
(OO)
Pass to (4)
Subject sub-grade
(SSG)
Subject special
Object sub-grade
(OSG)
(2)
Constraints
(4)
SAS
Subject activity
sequence
Object type (OT)
SSG and OSG
Refined privileges
(3)
Figure 3.8: PR Process Flow
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Step (2) works on the granular data level and focuses on subject sub-grades, object
sub-grades and subject special purpose (SSP). Evaluation of SSG and OSG has been
detailed in section 2.4.3. It is not necessary to have SSP for each granular data items;
if a subject does not specify any special purpose for granular data, rule 3.2 applies. If
the SSP complies with the OP, and the result of SSG and OSG evaluation is a pass,
step (3) will follow.
Rule 3.2: A subject special purpose (SSP) inherits its content from the subject main
purpose (SMP) only when the subject does not specify SSP for the relevant granular
data.
Step (3) works on combining subject constraints (SC), subject obligations (SO) and
object obligations (OO) together. These three attributes aim at either limiting the
subject privileges under certain conditions or requiring further activities. This step
merges conditions and obligations within the same category. For example, the
conditions "subject cannot access if out-of-office" and "cannot access between 6pm -
9am" are combined into "if time is between 9am - 6pm, and the subject is in-office,
then allow further privilege processing, otherwise access denied."
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Step (4) focuses on privilege selection. The privilege refinement algorithm was
detailed in section 2.4.3.
3.5 Model Verification
This section describes the formal model verification of PPDAC by using the
verification tool Failure Divergence Refinement (FDR), build 2.83 for academic
purposes.
FDR [132] is a model verification tool based on Communicating Sequential Processes
(CSP) state machines, where CSP is a processing language used in describing process
state switching. FDR has been widely used in formal model verification since 1996
[133], when Lowe found a man-in-the-middle attack in the Needham-Schroeder
public key protocols [134]. The system’s correct operation is verified in this section.
The steps to set up the verification tool were as follows:
1. Build the abstract model based of the proposed PPDAC and process as specified
in Figure 3.9, by using the CSP language.
2. Provide specifications for the FDR, which is by giving a valid requirement and
the requester can retrieve the proper required information, otherwise return errors.
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3. Run the model check to see whether the proposed PPDAC model satisfies the
specifications mentioned in step 2. If it does not, the model checker will provide a
counterexample.
The whole process can be briefly described as follows: a subject submits its identity
and request, and finally obtains the required object if the request is authorized. There
are four participants in the process flow: subject, subject server and object server. The
legend of Figure 3.9 is shown below.
Legend Explanation
chk_sg Evaluate SG and OG, SMP and OP
error Error message, a common syntax in FDR indicates errors,
authentication failure and any other unsuccessful process endings
get_obj Retrieve object from the data server
get_pobj Receive processed object
open_obj Get the required granular data
process_obj Remove unauthorized granular data and put in tracking seed if
required by the security need
pl_mat Evaluate SSG, OSG, access conditions and SAS
perform Refine privilege on the requested granular data
req_get Get object request
spl_gen Subject privacy label generation
warning A warning message indicates the failure of the SG and purpose
validation results
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Subject Subject
Server
Object
Server
request
Invalid ID ID is OK
spl_gen
check
YN
error
req_get
chk_sg
rejected passed
get_obj
YN
warning
errorerror
process_obj
get_pobj
reject
passed
pl_mat
YN
error errorerror
open_objPerform
success
user authentication
Figure 3.9 FDR Processing Flow Chart
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The object database only communicates with the object server, and hence, they are
combined together in the modeling. The verification result is shown in Figure 3.10.
Figure 3.10 FDR2 Verification Result
Figure 3.10 indicates that the process flow defined by the PPDAC model has satisfied
the requirement (in FDR, the requirement is called specification, see section 3.5 step
2) of the system and passed the sequence tests. To illustrate the information flow, the
debug window is shown in Figure 3.11. The debug window at the right displays the
data transferred in each step in the system during the verification test.
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Figure 3.11 FDR2 Debug Mode
The left window in Figure 3.11 shows the system structure. By clicking each
component node, the debug window gives the control codes that are processed within
it. This helps to determine how control codes are processed and where errors occur.
3.6 Illustrating Example
To help understanding the PPDAC model, this section presents an example of access
control in a cross-domain environment. It describes the involved parties (domains),
participants (subjects and objects), code base (privilege tables and roaming rules) and
a case that illustrates how the proposed model works.
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There are two organizations involved and shown in the Figure 3.12, each representing
an individual domain with its own subject server and object server. Organization A
(OA) has its own groups called sub-domains and denoted by domainAA and
domainAB. For example, organization A (OA) can be an international enterprise and
organization B (OB) can be a customer and marketing analysis company. Figure 3.13
to Figure 3.17 described the organization policies that are used by the proposed
model.
Organization A (Domain A) Organization B (Domain B)
Object
Server B
Object
Server A
Subject
Server B
Subject
Server A
Sub domain AA Sub domain AB
Figure 3.12: Illustrating Example
Access grades
Subject roles Subject grades
General Manager SG=9
Department Manager SG=6
Marketing staff SG=4
Figure 3.13: Access Grades
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Illustrating example legend
Components in privacy labels Explanation
DomainA.subjectX subject X in domain A
DomainA.subjectX.SG subject grade of subject X in domain A
DomainA.subjectX.constraints subject X’s constraints for request an object via
domain A
DomainA.subjectX.purpose The subject’s purpose when requesting an object
DomainB.objectY object Y in domain B
DomainB.objectY.OG object grade of object Y in domain B
DomainB.objectY.OT Object Y’s object type, including two attributes
category and specification
DomainB.objectY.purpose Is either AOP or POP
DomainB.objectY.obligation States the constraint related to the object server
Figure 3.14: Illustrating Example Legend
Activity list for the two organizations
Activity Explanation
read Read the specified granular data
add Add information to the granular data. Note: this
activity does not allow to remove information
remove Delete information from granular data. Note: this
activity does not allow to add information
edit Add and remove information of granular data
comment Comment to granular data. Note: this activity does
not allow editing original granular data.
sign Sign an object or certain part of an object. This
activity is used when someone approves or
acknowledges something
distribute Distribute to other domains’ subjects
manage Manage the object
Figure 3.15: Activity List For The Two Organizations
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Object grades
Object Object grades and sub-grades
report OG=5
Figure 3.16: Object Grades
Object Type Translation rules
Attributes in OT Explanation
category=report The “report” category means only the
data ower can edit and have to be
signed after every update.
Specification1=customer analysis Only marketing department and custom
service department are allowed to
access
Specification2=2010 Q1 Once created, no edit permission after
2010 Q2.
Figure 3.17: Object Type Translation Rules
Purpose translation rules
Purposes Activity in home domain Activity for roaming subject
Marketing Read,add, remove,distribute read
Figure 3.18: Purpose Translation Rules
In the example let us assume DomainA.subjectX is a marketing manager, who is
requesting the latest customer analysis report (ObjectY) from domain B and wants to
distribute this report to sub-domains within domain A.
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The marketing manager sends a duty request to the subject server in domain A which
is D = {DomainA.subjectX, SAread, SAdistribute, SAmanage, DomainB.objectY} together
with purpose “marketing”. The subject server identifies the DomainA.subjectX as a
marketing manager and sets DomainA.subjectX.SG = 6. The SPL is
{DomainA.subjectX, DomainA.subjectX. role = marketing manager,
DomainA.subjectX.purpose=marketing, DomainA.subjectX.SG = 6,
DomainA.subjectX.SP.SAS = [(SAread→ SAdistribute) ↕SAmanage], DomainA.subjectX.
SO.SAS = N/A, DomainA.subjectX.SC.SAS=N/A}
The object server sets DomainB.objectY.OG =5. DomainB.objectY.OT contains the
object category and specifications, which are represented as
DomainB.objectY.OT.category = report, DomainB.objectY.OT.specification1 =
customer analysis, DomainB.objectY.OT. specification2 = southeast suburbs and
DomainB.objectY.OT.specification3 = 2013 Q1. Each component of OT has its
privilege constraint for the subject who requests the object.
Then the OPL is {DomainB.objectY, DomainB.objectY.OG = 5,
DomainB.objectY.POP. SAS = SAedit, DomainB.objectY.OT.SAS = {if} <subject=data
owner> {then} SAedit <objectY> {and} SAsign [prepare report], {if} <domainA =
marketing department {or} domainA = customer service department> {then} SAread
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[marketing {or} customer service], DomainB.objectY. OO.SAS = {if} <licence> {then}
SAdistribute {and} SAmanage}.
The privilege refinement process is:
i) Compare SG and OG. Because SG is greater than OG (6>5), the subject is
allowed to access the record’s general information such as the file identifier.
ii) Compare SSG and OSG. Because the object does not have granular sections, no
comparison of SSG and OSG takes place.
iii) Generate the constraints: there is no constraint from the subject side. OT and
POP impose the following constraints, “{if} <subject=data owner> {then} SAedit
<objectY> {and} SAsign [prepare report]; {if} <domainA.subjectX = marketing
department {or} domainA.subjectX = customer service department> {then} SAread
[marketing {or} customer service], POP = SAedit”. In addition, the constraints
from the object server object obligation indicate that distribution and
management is allowed only if the subjectX has valid license, represented as “{if}
<license> {then} SAdistribute {and} SAmanage}”.
iv) If subjectX has a valid license, the refined subject activity sequence (SAS) will be
(SAread→SAdistribute)↕SAmanage for the report and the constraints from iii) apply; if
the subjectX does not have a valid license, the refined privilege will be SAread .
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3.7 Discussion
The model proposed in this chapter enhanced the privacy preserving access control
model of the previous chapter with purpose management; conditions and constraints
can be imposed on what the accessed data will be used for.
The proposed model enables access control that considers subjects, objects, as well as
purposes. The control module on the subject side is “three dimensional”, enabling
access management from three perspectives, namely organizational positions and
roles, access request with purposes and access restriction from the environment called
subject constraints. Similarly on the object side, the model has a “three dimensional”
object control module enabling object administration that considers the data owner’s
intentions in the form of object purposes, manage organizational and data repository
requirements that are expressed as object type and the environment by imposing
object obligations. The model overcomes the limitations of existing solutions, such as
lacking consideration of environment constraints and cooperation between subject
side control and object control.
From the perspective of purpose, the proposed model considers both subject purpose
and object purpose. Subject purpose can describe a user’s request along with access
conditions given by the role, and called subject obligation, and by the environment,
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called subject constraints. Object purpose takes intended purposes from the object
owner, and reduces the complexity of intended purpose control by permitting only the
allowed purposes and prohibited purposes. This can dispense with professional IT
knowledge of the data owners. In addition, the proposed model enables purpose
translation in roaming scenarios.
The overall model converts purposes to conditional and sequential privileges, so that
the various purposes can be controlled properly via a privilege control mechanism.
The model reduces the possibility of conflicts between different translations when
roaming occurs by decomposing a purpose into three parts that are easier to translate.
3.8 Summary
This chapter presents a purpose based access control model that incorporates a three
dimensional subject and object control mechanism.
It supports hierarchical subject (user) purpose and object (data) purpose. For subject
purpose, the proposed method supports user access purpose containing subject main
purpose and subject special purpose, user obligations and server constraints; while for
object purpose, it supports data type containing data category and specification, data
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owner’s purpose containing allowed purpose and prohibited purpose, and data server
constraints. In addition, the model supports purpose adjustment in roaming scenarios.
It also support complex conditions along with privilege sequences in both subject
control side and object control side.
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Part II
Privacy Preserving for Published Data
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Part I discussed data sharing with known recipients. This part of the thesis focuses on
privacy preserving of data shared with unknown recipients, which is also called data
publishing. For example, the Census Bureau publishes data regularly and healthcare
organizations publish medical data for data modeling and research purposes.
This part investigates the problem of protecting privacy by modifying the data, while
also maintaining data utility. Data privacy of published data is preserved if the
adversaries are not able to derive the original data from the modified (e.g. perturbed)
data or the re-constructed results are not close enough to the original data.
Maintaining Data utility means preserving data distribution, data format and data
range of the original data, so the modified data is still usable by unauthorized
recipients. At the same time, an authorized data recipient should be able to restore the
original data [48]. Chapter 4 reviews privacy protection of published data and related
literature. It also introduces evaluation methods. Chapters 5 and 6 present two data
privacy protection algorithms that are based on Chebyshev polynomials and fractal
sequences, respectively. Attack resistance is examined in the Appendix.
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Chapter 4
Data Privacy Protection for
Data Publishing: Basic Concepts
This is a short chapter that introduces the concept of perturbation and explains how the
methods proposed in the following two chapters are used.
4.1 Introduction
Protecting the privacy of individuals is a challenging task in today's world. The amount
of individual information published by various data holders is continually increasing.
Some organizations, such as governments and census bureaus, are required to make
personal information available, while other organizations, such as hospitals, may want to
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publish their data voluntarily for research purposes [154]. For example, a hospital may
release its patients’ medical/healthcare records to data analysts to facilitate the building
of a classification model. On the other hand, data publishers are prohibited by law from
disseminating any person-specific information that compromises an individual's privacy.
Therefore, a common precaution adopted by data publishers is to remove all explicit
identifiers such as name, address and social security number to make the resulting data
look completely anonymous [165].
Although explicit personal identifiers are usually removed before data is published, the
rest of the data can still make the data owner identifiable. A study conducted by Sweeney
[52] estimated that 87% of the population of the United States can be uniquely identified
using the seemingly innocuous attributes of gender, date of birth and 5-digit zip code.
Such identifiable attributes are termed as quasi-identifiers (QIs). Clearly, released data
containing such information about individuals should not be considered anonymous.
When such information is linked to a medical dataset that contains all the above
information along with diagnosis and medication data, they together constitute sensitive
information on individuals, which should not be leaked.
Accordingly, the data should be processed before being published so that it is resistant to
privacy leakage while still offering maximum utility to data analysts by allowing various
information to be derived from the processed data. A number of techniques have been
proposed to maintain privacy. Traditional encryption methods, including homomorphic
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encryption [146] prevent information leakage, but they compromise utility, because
encrypted data usually cannot be used for data analysis. Alternatively, data publishers
frequently apply data generalization techniques or data transformation algorithms for
privacy protection.
The generalization technique works by substituting the original values of given attributes
with more generalized ones, based on the generalization hierarchy built on top of each
attribute's domain [136], such as a student in computer science department can be
generalized to a student at RMIT University. However, most generalization techniques
suffer from a significant drawback in that the processed data is not restorable [67, 166].
If authorized users require access to the data, their request has to be responded to without
generalizing the data. To deal with such cases, data perturbation algorithms are employed,
which allow the restoration of the original data. Data perturbation works by combining
noise with the original data, by addition or by multiplication [171].
This part of the thesis focuses on the question of reducing the risk of privacy leak while
maintaining data utility when data is made available to different users. It presents a
solution that ensures that: (i) publicly available data preserves data privacy; (ii) analysts
who are not authorized to access real data are still able to utilize the publicly available
data; and (iii) authorized users have full access to the original data. This chapter proposes
a data privacy-preserving framework based on data perturbation. The original data is
modified by multiplication and addition in a way that preserves important features of the
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data, which allows its use for general analysis. The method is fully reversible, so
authorized users can restore the data to its original form without any information loss.
4.1.1 Chapter Outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature with
regard to the relevant algorithms for data privacy, so as to ascertain their limitations and
enable an attempt to overcome them. Section 4.3 introduces the proposed data privacy
protection framework (DP2F).
4.2 Background
This section first introduces the basic concepts and notation used in Part II. Then, it
reviews the literature on three types of approaches to data privacy: generalization,
anatomization and permutation, and perturbation.
4.2.1 Concepts and Notation
The data privacy usually relates to within a micro-table in which each row represents a
subject such as a person, a project or a company and each column indicates a particular
attribute of each subject, such as age, gender or personal income, or budget and bidder
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for a project, turnover of a company etc. Two examples of micro-tables are shown in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Example of format for micro-tables
In Table 4.1, attribute ‘Age’, ‘Sex’ and ‘Education’ can be used to identify individuals.
These attributes are called quasi-identifiers (QI). Formally, a quasi-identifier is a set of
attributes that, in combination, can be linked with external information to re-identify or
reduce uncertainty about all or some of the subjects [165]. Strictly speaking, a successful
data privacy attack results in the attacker being able to find additional information on an
individual or reduce the uncertainty about individuals’ data from this attack. To reduce
the chance of data privacy attack, many techniques focus on QI as this is one of the most
important factors in launching privacy attacks [52].
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One approach to fending off privacy attacks is data perturbation, in which the original
data is combined with noise and its values are changed. This part of the thesis proposes
perturbation methods, that keep the processed data readable and in the same form, e.g. if
it is numeric before processing, it is still numeric afterwards.
4.2.2 Generalization
Each generalization operation hides some details in QI attributes by replacing some
values with a parent value, and the replaced values are not disclosed. This section first
looks at four generalization schemes for protecting published data. Full-domain
generalization indicates that all values in an attribute are generalized to the same level,
such as in k-anonymity [53, 66] and incognito [74]. For example, for the attribute Career,
Lawyer and Engineer are generalized to Professional, and, Career, Dancer and Writer
are generalized to Artist. In k-anonymity, if a subject has a particular attribute value, then
at least (k-1) other subjects must have the same attribute value. While k-anonymity
addresses a major issue, it also has some weaknesses. Machanavajjhala et al. presented
two cases in which tables that satisfied k-anonymity did not protect privacy [67]. A
homogeneity attack is possible if sensitive values lack diversity, and results in the
sensitive values being revealed. To counter the attack, a stronger privacy scheme, called
l-diversity, was proposed [68]. It requires every QI group having at least l different
values for the sensitive attribute, and the proportion of each sensitive value in every QI
group should be less than or equal to 1/l. While l-diversity is a stronger privacy scheme
than k-anonymity, it still has limitations [166]. When the distribution of the sensitive data
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in the overall data set is skewed, l-diversity, in fact, can increase the probability of
identification [166]. Also, when the data in an l-diverse group are syntactically different
but semantically similar, important information can be learnt by an adversary. The
method t-closeness [166] addresses these issues by requiring that the difference between
distribution within each group and that of the general data set should not be more than a
threshold t. The second generalization category is called Sub-tree generalization. [75-78].
These solutions require only the same sub-tree elements to be generalized. For example,
if Engineer is generalized to Professional, Lawyer will also be generalized to
Professional, but Dancer and Writer can remain unchanged as they belong to the parent
Artist, a different sub-tree. An improved sub-tree method has been proposed in [74],
which keeps some siblings unchanged. For example, if Engineer is generalized to
Professional, Lawyer can still remain unchanged and Professional refers to all jobs under
this sub-tree except Lawyer. The third generalization scheme is called Cell generalization
developed in [79, 80]. These solutions keep some values of an attribute unchanged while
other values of the same attribute are generalized. For example, one Engineer is
generalized to Professional and another Engineer can remain unchanged. The fourth
generalization is called Multidimensional generalization [81-83] which considers
multiple QI attributes as a tuple and each QI can be decided whether to be generalized
independently. For example “engineer, male” can be generalized to “engineer, Any
Gender” while “engineer, female” can be generalized to “professional, female”.
CHAPTER 4 DATAPRIVACY PROTECTION FOR DATA PUBLISHING:
BASIC CONCEPTS
128
In summary, different generalization schemes bring distinct data utility and data
distortion (data privacy). Most of them satisfy privacy requirements but provide
insufficient data utility [136]. Generalization schemes are used as a baseline for
comparison with the proposed methods, in the experiment as these schemes keep some
original data features, such as data value range and data value form.
4.2.3 Anatomization and Permutation
Anatomization dissects the data and de-associates the relationship between QI and
sensitive attributes rather than modifies QI. The approach in [87] divides the original data
into two separate tables: QI table containing QI attributes and sensitive data table
containing sensitive data attributes. Both QI table and sensitive data table have only one
common attribute called group ID. The values in the same group will be linked then the
data can be used.
Permutation proposed in [88, 151] de-associates the relationship between a QI and a
numerical sensitive attribute by partitioning a set of data records into groups and
shuffling their sensitive values within each group. Another form of anatomy is called data
table fragmentation, which divides original data table into several tables and links them
via certain chosen attributes [143, 144].
As anatomization and permutation do not modify the original data, they may still need
support from a generalization scheme such as k-anonymity and l-diversity. Also, without
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both tables being available at the same time, data utility reduces significantly; while with
both tables released together, privacy protection cannot be maintained without an other
privacy protection method.
4.2.4 Perturbation
There are many data perturbation methods. Data re-ordering [150] and nearest neighbor
data-substitution [167] techniques work by substituting values of the same attribute,
while approaches in [79, 87] divide the original table into several sub-tables and re-group
the sub-tables [79, 87]. Rotation-based transformation is usually applied in multi-
dimensional space and transforms the whole data set [147, 174], or different sub-tables
by using different parameters [148, 168, 175], to another form while still keeping the
Euclidean distance between each pair of values. As the names suggest, additive
perturbation adds noise to the original data [89-92] while multiplicative perturbation
multiplies the data by some noise to hide sensitive information [149, 152].
The re-ordering, re-grouping and data splitting techniques are vulnerable to data linkage
attack as they did not modify original data values. Rotation-based techniques lose data
utility by changing data format, data value range or distribution. Additive and
multiplicative perturbation techniques are either vulnerable to data reconstruction attack
or lose data utility [160, 161].
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This thesis proposes two methods for generating noise that can be combined with the
original data for perturbation, and be removed afterwords in the restoration phase. The
proposed methods use a hybrid perturbation mechanism to overcome the drawbacks in
existing solutions.
4.3 Data Privacy Protection Framework
In the following a privacy protection framework is described, that can employ the
perturbation methods proposed in chapters 5 and 6. To implement the proposed
framework, the data is assumed to be numerical and stored in micro-tables. The
perturbation algorithms work on one attribute stored as a column in the micro-table and
is represented as a vector A=[a1, a2,...,aM]T,where ],[ qpai  , ],1[ Mi , M is the number
of records/individuals (rows), and p and q are the bounds of the attribute. Typically, the
original data has a pre-determined format and value range, such as age should be from 1
to 99, disease code should be within a certain range etc.
The proposed framework is shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 4.1 shows the
perturbation process flow and Figure 4.2 depicts the process in which the original data is
restored from the perturbed data. The heart of the proposed method is the data
perturbation algorithm that takes the original data and transforms it to similar data in the
same format. The perturbation parameters are the key used for both the data perturbation
and restoration, in the same way as in symmetric-key encryption. In order to keep the
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difference between the original and perturbed values within a well-defined range, data
scaling is used.
In the first step, the perturbation noise is generated and a privacy-preserving
transformation is applied. In the proposed framework, two individual perturbation noise
values are calculated for each data item in the series, and then combined with the original
data; one noise is for multiplicative perturbation and the other for additive perturbation.
The second step is scaling the perturbed data to ensure that the perturbed and original
data will be in the same value range. The reason to use a hybrid method is that compared
to either additive or multiplicative methods, hybrid ones have better resistance to data
reconstruction attack methods [162].
To restore the original data, the perturbation noise is recalculated, the scaling is reversed
and the privacy-preserving transformation is inverted. As both scaling and the privacy-
preserving transformation are lossless operations, the original data can be accurately
restored.
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Figure 4.1: Proposed DP2F Perturbation Process Flow
Figure 4.2: Proposed DP2F Data Restoration Flow
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Chapter 5
Chebyshev Data Perturbation
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a data privacy preserving method called Chebyshev data
perturbation (CDP). CDP implements the data perturbation part of the Data Privacy
Preserving Framework (DP2F), presented in chapter 4. Hybrid data processing is used,
which comprises an additive part and a multiplicative part. Both parts use Chebyshev
polynomials to generate initial noise sequences. Such sequences are then scaled,
based on the perturbation parameters and the features of the original dataset, to ensure
that the perturbation values fall into the same value range as the original data values.
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The proposed method is evaluated in terms of data utility and information added by
the perturbation noise. Attack resistance tests are also presented in the Appendix.
The distinguishing features of the proposed method are the following. i) It is able to
keep the perturbed data in the same value range as the original data, and so it is
computationally hard to distinguish the original from perturbed data; ii) the data
utility in terms of data distribution is maintained; iii) it resists two classic data privacy
attacks.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the
mathematical fundamentals. In section 5.3, the proposed method will be detailed via
perturbation values, scaling perturbation values, the perturbation process and the
restoration process. Section 5.4 implements the evaluation methods introduced in
chapter 4 and evaluates the proposed method by these methods in terms of added
information and data utility. Section 5.5 discusses the proposed method against
existing solutions and section 5.6 summarizes the chapter. Attack resistance
experiments are described in the Appendix.
CHAPTER 5 CHEBYSHEV DATA PERTURBATION
135
5.2 Mathematical Foundations– Chebyshev
Polynomials
To assist the generation of perturbation sequences, Chebyshev polynomials of the
first kind are adopted. These are first introduced in this section, followed by a
discussion of the reasons why they are used in the proposed method.
Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind are defined by the recurrence relation shown
in equations (5-1).
1)(0 xT
xxT )(1
)()(2)( 11 xTxxTxT nnn   (5-1)
Each polynomial degree leads to a differently shaped curve. Figure 5.1 illustrates the
polynomial curve for some degrees of n in the [-1, 1] interval.
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Figure 5.1: The First Few Chebyshev Polynomials −1 < x < 1 [178]
Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind are used in the perturbation algorithm for the
following reasons.
i) within the range of -1<x<1, the value of Tn(x) is in the range [-1, 1], and
ii) for a given value of Tn(x), the original x cannot be calculated without knowing
the polynomial degree n [179];
In the rest of this chapter, the term Chebyshev polynomials is used instead of the full
title of Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind.
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5.3 Proposed Method - Chebyshev Data
Perturbation (CDP)
This section first provides an overview of the Chebyshev Data Perturbation (CDP)
process flow, components, assumptions and scenarios. Then it details the proposed
hybrid perturbation algorithm. Hybrid perturbation indicates the combination of
additive and multiplicative techniques, that is, perturbation values are added to and
multiplied by the original data. This section concludes with the restoration process.
5.3.1 Overall Process Flow
Figure 5.2 shows the CDP data perturbation process which is explained as follows.
First, two Chebyshev polynomials are generated, with the polynomial degrees of n1
and n2; the generated polynomials are represented by N1 and N2. Then, N1 and N2 ,
together with four perturbation parameters (α, β, γ and ) and segmentation parameter
k, are used to calculate perturbation values. Finally, the perturbation values are
merged with the original data.
To restore the original data, the same perturbation noise is calculated again, and is
removed from the perturbed data.
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Figure 5.2: CDP Overall Process Flow
5.3.2 The Proposed Chebyshev Perturbation Algorithm
To facilitate the mathematical treatment of the proposed perturbation algorithm, it is
assumed that the data to be privacy protected is a series of items, such as a row or
column in a micro table. Treating this data as a vector, the calculations are performed
on this vector. The basic perturbation equation takes the form of
21 PNPNODPD  , where PD is the perturbed data, OD is the original data, PN1
and PN2 are perturbation noise calculated as follows. )]1()[( 1111 SFNSFPN 
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and 222 NSFPN  , where N1 and N2 are calculated using Chebyshev polynomials
of the first kind, but the degree of the polynomials is different for the two components;
while SF1 and SF2 are scaling factors to keep the perturbed data values in a defined
range. The main advantage of the Chebyshev polynomials here is that their values
oscillate between +1 and -1 on the [-1, +1] interval. Note: PN1 must never be zero to
ensure reversibility of the process. If the calculations produce a zero for PN1, it is
replaced by a preliminarily agreed value that is used for multiplication during
perturbation and for division in the restoring phase.
5.3.2.1 Calculating the Perturbation Values
The actual values of the perturbation noise are used for both data transformation and
restoration. The calculation of these values is performed in three steps. This section
first introduces the overall calculation process and then explains each step in detail.
The overall calculation process can be described as follows. First, the original data
series is divided into k groups or subvectors, as shown in Figure 5.3. The number of
data elements need not be the same in each group, for example, group 1 may have 5
data elements, group 2 may have only 4 data elements, group 3 may have 5 data
elements again, and so on. Then each group is linearly mapped to the (-1,+1) interval,
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i.e. each data element is mapped to a number between -1 and +1, and the Chebyshev
polynomial’s value is calculated at each mapped point as shown in Figure 5.3. This
polynomial value is used to calculate the perturbation noise. Three parameters (α, β, γ)
are introduced for information hiding and one () for scaling. The first parameter, α is
used to shift the Chebyshev polynomial along the x axis, the second parameter, β is
used to compress the polynomial along the x-axis, and the third parameter, γ is used to
compress (or expand) the polynomial along the y-axis. Another parameter  is used
for scaling, so that the perturbed data remains in the same value range as the original
data.
The calculation of the perturbation values involves three steps:
i) division of the original data into groups;
ii) calculation of the perturbation values for each original data item (vector
element), and
iii) performing the perturbation and scaling operations. Here, a data item is an
attribute record presented as ai. Each of these steps is explained below.
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Figure 5.3: Process for Obtaining the Perturbation Vector
pt1(1)
pt1(7)
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Step 1 Data grouping
The original data is divided into k groups or subvectors as follows. Division length
(DL) is defined as kMDL / , where M denotes the number of the original data
elements and 22
Mk  . Let group i have ti number of elements (see Figure 5.3),
and t0 = 0. Then )(1 DLfloort  , where floor() represents the integer part of a
number, 12 )2( tDLfloort  and 


1
1
)()(
i
j
ji DLtfloorDLifloort , where
ki 1 . The number of elements in the different groups may not be the same, but
this has no effect on the perturbation calculations. In this way, the original attribute
vector rA is divided into k number of subvectors, which can be expressed as
}1,1|{)( )( ijtr tjkiaiA i   , where a(ti+j) denotes the j-th element in group i
of the original dataset. Parameter β, where 0 < β < 1, is a compression factor that is
used to map the range [-1,+1] to [-β, +β]. In the whole process, element j in group i is
associated first with a point between -1 and +1, and subsequently with a point
between –β and +β. The point in the [-β, +β] interval which corresponds to ai(j) is
denoted as xij and is given by the formula
i
ij t
jx  2 .
Step 2 Perturbation noise calculation:
The perturbation noise is calculated for each element ai(j) in each group. Group i has
it elements, and for each element )( jai in interval i, two perturbation values
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cdp1i(j) and cdp2i(j) are calculated as shown in equations (5-2) and (5-3). The first
value, cdp1i(j) is for the multiplicative component and cdp2i(j) is for the additive
component of the perturbation. In the calculations, the polynomial values are
calculated at a modified x’ij point, which is calculated as 
  iij t
jx 2' . The
factor α is introduced as an additional security parameter that is known by authorized
users only. The effect is a shift of the x values in the negative direction, and the
magnitude of the shift changing from zero at x = –β to 

it
at x = +β in a linearly
decreasing fashion. By decreasing the shift magnitude in this way, I can keep the
shifted value in the [-β, +β] interval. The actual perturbation values are calculated by
the following formulas: cdp1i(j) = Tn(x’ij) and cdp2i(j) = Tn+1(x’ij). Here, Tn is the
Chebyshev polynomial of degree n, while j indicates the index of an element within
group i. To reduce possible correlation between cdp1 and cdp2, the degrees of the
Chebyshev polynomials were chosen so that one polynomial is not a divisor of the
other; Tn and Tn+1 satisfy this criterion according to [180]. Inserting the values of x’ in
the formulas equations (5-2) and (5-3) are obtained..
)2()( 
  ini t
jTjcdp1 1 ≤ j ≤ ti (5-2)
)2()( 1 
   ini t
jTjcdp2 1 ≤ j ≤ ti (5-3)
The values of cdp1i(j) and cdp2i(j) are in the range of [-1, +1], as 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
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Step 3: Scaling the noise
The utility of the perturbed data can be improved if some statistical parameters of the
original data are maintained in the perturbation process. This requires additional
processing that restores these characteristics of the data. Two cases are presented here.
First, the perturbed data has the same mean as the original; in the second case,
maximum difference between the perturbed and original data is kept within
well-defined limits. In both cases, two scaling factors γ and  are used to achieve the
aim. The next section explains how the original data is perturbed.
5.3.2.2 Perturbation
This section presents two perturbation methods. One is to maintain the mean of the
original data and the other is to limit the difference between the perturbed and
original data.
To maintain the mean of the original data, two scaling factors γ and  are introduced
as follows.


 
 

 k
i
t
j
ii
k
i
t
j
i
i
i
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ja
1 1
1 1
))](1()([
)(
  (5-4)
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The multiplicative and additive parts can be calculated using formulas (5-6) and
(5-7).
pt1i(j)=cdp1i(j) ·γ + (1 - γ) (5-6)
pt2i(j) =cdp2i(j) ·δ (5-7)
The perturbed data are then calculated by equation (5-8).
ai’(j)=ai(j) · pt1i(j) + pt2i(j) (5-8)
Based on equations (5-4) to (5-8), the mean of the perturbed data is
M
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Which is the same as that of the original data.
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The second method limits the difference between the perturbed and the original data.
In this case, the values of scaling factors γ and  can be directly assigned, and the
additive and multiplicative parts can be calculated using the same formulas as the first
method, equations (5-6) and (5-7). In the second method γ and  are the perturbation
scale controllers; they scale the )( jcdpi in order to limit the magnitude of the
perturbation noise. The perturbed data are then calculated by equation (5-8).
5.3.2.3 Restoration
In order to accurately restore the original data, all parameters have to be correctly
procured, i.e. the Chebyshev polynomial degrees (n1 and n2), data segmentation
parameter (k) and scaling parameters (α, β, γ and ) have to be known. The restoration
steps are listed below and are shown in Figure 5.4.
1. Initialize factors and parameters, and derive the perturbation Chebyshev
polynomials.
2. Calculate division intervals and compute both additive and multiplicative
parts according to Section 5.3.2
3. The output sequence from step 2 is applied on the perturbed data to restore the
original data, based on equation (5-9).
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Figure 5.4: Restoration Process
5.4 Experiments and Results
5.4.1 Evaluation and Experimental Setup
This subsection describes how the evaluation methods, introduced in chapter 4, are
used to examine the proposed method and the setup of the experimental environment.
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The datasets in the experiments followed particular distributions and were generated
randomly.
5.4.1.1 Distribution Tests
The number of data samples was M=4000, and their value was in the range of 30 to
50 for the normal distribution and 25 to 65 for the uniform distribution. For the
proposed method, three sets of the parameters were chosen as follows.
i) k=11, n=13, α=4.7, β=(n+5)/(n+6), δ=2, γ=0.05, results in PA ≈ 5%.
ii) k=11, n=13, α=4.7, β=(n+5)/(n+6), δ=5, γ=0.1, results in PA ≈ 10%.
iii) k=11, n=13, α=4.7, β=(n+5)/(n+6), δ=10, γ=0.5, results in PA ≈ 20%.
For the comparison, the generalization technique used 5 as value intervals, such as
[25-29], [30-34], etc. The parameters for the proposed method were chosen as
reasonable values for the generated dataset.
The experiments were carried out on an Intel® i7-3770 machine with 16G RAM on a
Linux Fedora operating system, and Matlab was used for data generation in all tests.
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5.4.1.2 Empirical Information Content Tests
Information content is a common metric of a dataset [154, 184], and is calculated
according to equation (5-10),
)(log)( 2 ixPXI  (5-10)
where vector X has x1, x2..., xM total M elements (original data samples) and )( ixP
denotes the probability to have xi identified [184]. By measuring information content
added to the data, in other words the distortion of the data, we can characterize the
effectiveness of a particular data protection method.
Assuming each data item has the same probability to be identified, the information
content for the whole data set can be expressed as equation (5-11).
W(X) = -M log 2P(xi) (5-11)
For the original data, as no added information is involved, W(X) = 0. For
k-anonymized data set, the added information content of the data set is kM 2log .
For l-diversity on k-anonymized data set, the information content is calculated by
lkM  2log and in the tests, l = k.
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For the proposed method, each data is perturbed by the hybrid perturbation method
and the noise value added is pti(j) denoting the perturbation value for the j-th element
in the i-th interval. Let Max(pt) denote the maximum difference between the original
data and the perturbed data value. Given a perturbed data )(' ja i , the original data is
))](()(')),(()('[)( jptMaxjajptMaxjaja iiiii  . Therefore, P(xi) can be
calculated as ))((2
1
jptMax i
. Then, the information content for the proposed method
can be calculated as ))](([2log 2 jptMaxM i .
The information content tests were carried out three times and each of them uses the
same parameters as those in the distribution tests. These experiments not only
compare the results of different methods, but also show the impact of the proposed
method’s parameters on information content. The parameter k in k-anonymized data
set is 5 and l = k = 5 for l-diversity.
5.4.2 Experimental Performance
This section shows the experimental results generated by the evaluation methods
presented in section 5.4.1. Two experiments are described in this section, which are
the distribution and information content. Attack resistance is described in the
Appendix.
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Figures 5.5 to 5.10 depict the distribution of the original, perturbed and generalized
data. Three sets of parameters were used and each set generated one normal
distribution and one uniform distribution.
5.4.2.1 Distribution Tests
Figure 5.5: Distribution Test -- Normal Distribution with PA ≈ 5%
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Figure 5.6: Distribution Test -- Uniform Distribution with PA ≈ 5%
Figure 5.7: Distribution Test -- Normal Distribution with PA ≈ 10%
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Figure 5.8: Distribution Test -- Uniform Distribution with PA ≈ 10%
Figure 5.9: Distribution Test -- Normal Distribution with PA ≈ 20%
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Figure 5.10: Distribution Test -- Uniform Distribution with PA ≈ 20%
As expected, Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the distribution of the perturbed data is almost
the same as that of the original data, when the PA is approximate 5%. From the
Figures 5.7 and 5.8, it can be seen that the distributions of the perturbed data,
obtained by using the proposed method, and the original data still closely follow each
other, while when the PA reached approximate 20%, the distribution of the perturbed
method deviated from the original data. In all distribution tests, the generalization
method changes the distribution.
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5.4.2.2 Information Content
The information content tests show the added distortion to the original data by the
proposed method, k-anonymity and l-diversity. In the tests, different data sizes were
chosen so that the trend also can be seen from the diagram. The parameters used for
the proposed method in these tests were the same as that of the distribution tests.
Figures 5.11 to 5.13 show that the proposed algorithm significantly increases the
distortion and outperforms k-anonymity or l-diversity when the magnitude of the
perturbation noise is at least 10% of the original data. Even when the noise is only 5%,
the proposed method still outperforms k-anonymity.
Figure 5.11: Information Content Test with PA ≈ 5%
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Figure 5.12: Information Content Test with PA ≈ 10%
Figure 5.13: Information Content Test with PA ≈ 20%
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5.4.2.3 Attack Resistance
Attack resistance is examined in the Appendix.
5.5 Discussion
The proposed perturbation method provides a significant contribution in the data
privacy preserving area by being able to maintain data utility in terms of (i) the
perturbed data closely follows distribution as that of original data, (ii) the data format
is kept and (iii) the data value range is kept. And above all, it provides data privacy.
Compared to the generalization technique, although both of them are able to protect
data privacy, the generalization method impairs data utility in terms of data
distribution while the proposed method is able to maintain it. In addition, other
methods are vulnerable to classic data reconstruction (SPF and BE-DR) attacks [145,
162]. On the other hand, the proposed method not only maintains data utility but also
resists these two attacks.
As Figures 5.5 to 5.8 illustrate, the transformed values maintain almost the same
distribution as the original data. Figures 5.11 to 5.13 show the information content
added by the processed data of different methods. The experiments showed that while
PA is equal to 5%, the proposed method is not as good as l-diversity and the actual
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noise added by the perturbed value is very small. When PA reaches 10%, the
proposed method has better results than both k-anonymity and l-diversity. Under the
same circumstance, the proposed method can still maintain the data distribution, as
shown in distribution test. The proposed method can also keep the perturbed data in
the original value range, and so the perturbed data cannot be distinguished from the
original data.
A comparison of the various features of the proposed method with other techniques in
the literature is summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Comparison of the Methods
Privacy
protection
method
Proposed CDP
method
Existing
perturbation
methods
Generalization
methods
Perturbed data
range
Can be fixed within
a range
Arbitrary Can be fixed
within a range
Privacy
protection
High level Medium level Medium level
Flexibility for
adaptation
Yes No Yes
Robustness to
attacks
High Low Medium
Data utility of
perturbed data
Medium – High Medium Low to Medium
Attributes
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, a hybrid, multiplicative and additive data perturbation method was
proposed to protect the privacy of published data. The perturbation maintains data
utility by keeping certain characteristics of the original data. This chapter presented
two options: the first maintained the mean of the original data, while the second kept
the amplitude of the perturbation (the ratio of the original to perturbed data) within
limits determined by the user. As the perturbation is reversible, authorized users who
know the perturbation parameters can restore the original data. Unauthorized users
who do not know the parameters cannot restore the original values, but still utilize the
perturbed data.
The quality of perturbation is measured as the added distortion. It was shown that the
method performs better than others and considerably increases the distortion when the
perturbation noise is large. In the case of smaller perturbation noise, the increase is
smaller while the distortion is still larger than that of the original data but other
methods, such as l-diversity, can produce better results.
With regard to privacy protection, the proposed method resists the Spectral filtering
(SPF) and Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction (BE-DR) attacks.
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The proposed method was originally designed for small datasets. The next chapter
introduces another data privacy perturbation algorithm that deals with a large
volumes of data.
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Chapter 6
μ-Fractal Data Perturbation
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a data privacy preserving technique named μ-Fractal data
perturbation which is used for privacy protection of data publishing. It implements
the data privacy preserving framework (DP2F, detailed in chapter 4), and incorporates
fractals to take advantage of its self-similarity characteristic and chaotic feature
(when the initial parameter is unknown) [181].
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The evaluation and experiments are carried out in three categories, namely
distribution and information content of the processed data. These methods have been
introduced in chapter 5. Attack resistance tests are explained in the Appendix.
The main features of this chapter are the following. The proposed method (i) resists
spectral filter (SPF) and Bayes-Estimation Data Reconstruction (BE-DR) attacks, ii)
keeps the perturbed data in the same value range and data format as the original data,
and iii) maintains the data distribution.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the
mathematical fundamentals of fractals and chaos. In section 6.3, the proposed method
is detailed via perturbation values, the perturbation process and the restoration
process. Section 6.4 describes experiments to evaluate the methods in terms of
distribution and information added by processing the data. Section 6.5 discusses the
proposed method against existing solutions and section 6.6 summarizes the chapter.
Attach resistance tests are described in the Appendix.
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6.2 Mathematical Foundations
The adopted fractal function, called Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map, [182] is
represented by equation (6-1), where μ is a parameter in the fractal value sequence
generation.
)1(1 nnn xxx   (6-1)
Figure 6.1 illustrates the fractal nature of the Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map
[181], which shows the output sequences based on different μ values. This is a typical
fractal function and each sub-sequence of the fractal is similar to the overall sequence
[181]. Also, in such a fractal, when μ is between 3.5699 and 4, the system is chaotic
[182, 183]. Chaotic here can be explained as “when the present determines the future,
but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future” [181-183].
In other words, the chaotic fractal sequence heavily depends on the initial parameters
and different initial parameters cannot derive the same fractal sequence.
To illustrate the fractal’s characteristics, Figure 6.2 (a-f) shows time sequences (n in
equation 6-1) based on different μ values. It can be seen that the fluctuations in the
fractal’s value become irregular when μ is between 3.5699 and 4. This figure shows
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the uncertainty of the fractal feature. NOTE: this chapter focuses on the fractal only
when μ is greater than 3.5699 and less than 4.
Figure 6.1: Bifurcation Diagram of The Logistic Map
Figure 6.2 (a): Time Sequences Based on μ=3.10000
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Figure 6.2 (b): Time Sequences Based on μ=3.56990
Figure 6.2 (c): Time Sequences Based on μ=3.80000
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Figure 6.2 (d): Time Sequences Based on μ=3.91230
Figure 6.2 (e): Time Sequences Based on μ=4.00000
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Figure 6.2 (f): Time Sequences Based on μ=4.00010
The features used in this chapter are the fractal and chaos characteristics of this
function. The fractal feature indicates self-similarity which means any part of the
generated sequence has a similar shape to the overall sequence. The chaos feature
indicates that without the initial values of the sequence, the whole sequence shows a
random manner [181].
6.3 μ-Fractal Data Perturbation (μ-FDP)
This section first provides an overview of μ-FDP, including the overall process flow
and algorithm brier. Then, it details the proposed algorithm in terms of the calculation
CHAPTER 6 μ-FRACTAL DATAPERTURBATION
168
of fractal sequences and perturbation vectors. At the end of this section, the
restoration process is presented.
6.3.1 Overview of µ-FDP
The main components of the perturbation process flow are the original data, fractal
sequences 1 (FS1) and 2 (FS2), and perturbation vectors 1 (PV1) and 2 (PV2).
Original data
Additive portion
Perturbation Vector 2
(PV2)
Multiplicative portion
Perturbation Vector 1
(PV1) Perturbed
data
Fractal Sequence 1
FS1
Fractal Sequence 2
FS2
Figure 6.3: u-FDP Perturbation Process Flow
Perturbed data
Additive portion
Perturbation Vector 2
(PV2)
Multiplicative portion
Perturbation Vector 1
(PV1) Original
data
Fractal Sequence 1
FS1
Fractal Sequence 2
FS2
Figure 6.4: u-FDP Restoration Process Flow
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The main components in both perturbation and restoration flows are explained in the
following.
1) Original Data denotes the attributes that are being protected, which can be a
column in a micro-table or a vector. The data being protected have to be numeric,
such as age, post code, disease code etc. As non-numeric data can be converted to
numeric based on certain rules [169], this is not a real restriction. Typically, the type
of original data has a determined format and value range, for example, an age should
be within [1, 99], disease code should be within [1-001, 1-110] ∩ [2-001, 2-045] ∩ ....
Usually, these two features, namely format and value range are used to justify
whether the data is valid or not.
2) Fractal Sequence (FS) are the results of the fractal equations. Given the initial
parameters and the total number of the results, a fractal sequence is derived. In the
proposed method, there are two fractal sequences represented by FS1 and FS2. Both
are generated from the equation (6-1) with different initial parameters. Each value in
the sequences is within (0, 1) according to the feature of the applied fractal function
[182].
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3) Perturbation Vector (PV) is the noise sequence used to perturb the data. There are
two perturbation vectors, PV1 and PV2 that are used as the multiplicative and additive
portion of the perturbation noise, respectively.
To facilitate mathematical treatment, we assume that the data to be privacy-protected
is in a row or a column in a micro-table. This data is used as a vector, and the
perturbing calculations are executed on this vector. The perturbation, according to the
DP2F (chapter 4), is performed in two steps: (i) noise calculation; and (ii) scaling. In
the first step, two individual perturbation noise sets, FS1 and FS2, are calculated - one
is for multiplicative perturbation and the other is for additive perturbation. The
second step is scaling the FS and generating the PV to ensure that the perturbed data
maintains data utility while protecting data privacy.
The perturbation can be written in the form of PD = OD × PV1 + PV2, where PD is
the perturbed data, OD is the original data, PV1 and PV2 are perturbation noise. PV1 is
a function of FS1 and PV2 is a function of FS2.
To obtain the original data, the fractal sequences are recalculated, the scaling is
reversed and the perturbation process is inverted. As both scaling and the proposed
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perturbation are lossless operations, the original data can be accurately restored. The
restoration process is detailed in section 6.3.3.
Table 6.1: Summarized Notion
Parameters Explanation
μ1 and μ2 Fractal initial parameters for generating fractal sequence 1
and fractal sequence 2, see equation (6-1)
x0 and y0 Fractal initial parameters for generating fractal sequence 1
and fractal sequence 2, see equation (6-1)
ρ Scaling parameter for the multiplicative part of the
proposed method
 Scaling parameter for the additive part of the proposed
method
FS1 and FS2 Fractal sequence 1 and fractal sequence 2, which are
derived from equation (6-1)
PV1 and PV2 Perturbation vector 1 and perturbation vector 2, which are
calculated from FS1 and FS2.
A and A’ The original dataset and the perturbed dataset
ai and ai’ The i-th data of the original dataset and of the perturbed
data set
M The number of data items in the original dataset
p and q The lower bound and upper bound of the original dataset
gi and hi The i-th element of perturbation vector 1 and perturbation
vector 2
6.3.2 Perturbation Algorithm
The proposed algorithm has three parts, namely the generation of fractal sequences
(subsection 6.3.2.1), the generation of the multiplicative perturbation vector
(subsection 6.3.2.2) and the generation of the additive perturbation vector (subsection
6.3.2.3). Before introducing the algorithm, all symbols are summarized below.
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6.3.2.1 Initial Parameters and Fractal Sequences
The parameters are used to initialize the perturbation process are the following: μ1
and X0 for the generation of fractal sequence 1 (FS1), and μ2 and Y0 for fractal
sequence 2 (FS2). The algorithm operates progressively column-by-column. Here the
explanation is given for one column (one attribute) and the extension of it to the other
columns is trivial. The attribute can be represented as a vector Ar = [a1, a2,....aM]T,
where M denotes the total number of the original data, ai denotes the i-th original data
element, ai[p, q] and i[1, M].
Fractal Sequence
FS
Initial parameter
X0
Initial parameter
μ
Figure 6.5: FS Generation Flow
In the proposed method, a value for µ and for x0 is chosen respectively, where μ
 (3.5699, 4). With the parameters μ1 and x0, the first fractal sequence can be
calculated based on equation (6-1) and represented by FS1= [x1, x2... xM]. Similarly,
the second fractal sequence is calculated with the parameter μ2 and Y0 and represented
by FS2= [y1, y2... yM].
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6.3.2.2 Perturbation Vector 1
The process of generating perturbation vector 1 (PV1) is depicted in Figure 6.6. The
calculation is carried out in two steps, which are explained below.
Original data
feature Perturbation Vector 1
PV1Fractal sequence 1
FS1
Scaling parameter
ρ
Figure 6.6 PV1 Generation Flow
The perturbation algorithm transforms the fractal sequence 1 (FS1) to perturbation
vector PV1 by first mapping elements x1 in FS1 into the original attribute data range
[p, q]. This process is illustrated in Figure 6.7 and in
],[')1,0(: qpxxf ii  , where i is from 1 to M. The mapping equation is
ppqxix ii  )()(' .
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x1
x2
...
xM
x’1
x’2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
x’M
0
1
p
q
Figure 6.7 FS Mapping Diagram
The second step applies scaling parameter ρ to all elements gi in PV1 by
iiii axag  )'( , where ai denotes the i-th original data element.
6.3.2.3 Perturbation Vector 2
The process of generating perturbation vector 2 (PV2) is depicted in Figure 6.8. The
calculation of element hi in PV2 is  ii yh , where  is the scaling parameter for
additive part of the proposed method.
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Perturbation Vector 2
PV2
Scaling parameter

Fractal sequence 2
FS2
Figure 6.8 PV2 Generation Flow
6.3.2.4 Perturbation
After the calculation of both perturbation vectors, the perturbed data is derived by
combining these vectors (see Figure 6.9). Let a'i be the perturbed data of ai. With both
PV1 and PV2, the perturbed data a'(i) can be derived from iii hga ' .
Perturbed
data
Perturbation
vector 1
Perturbation
vector 2
Figure 6.9 Perturbation Noise Combination
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6.3.3 Restoration
The restoration key is the same to the perturbation key. In order to calculate the
original data sets, the restoration key is composed of x0, μ1 and ρ for the calculation of
PV1, and y0, μ2 and  for the calculation of PV2. Then the original data ai is calculated
via the following steps:
 Both fractal sequence 1 (FS1) and 2 (FS2) are calculated based on equation (6-1)
 Perturbation vector 1 PV1 is calculated as explained in section 6.3.2.2 and PV2 is
calculated as explained in section 6.3.2.3.
 Original data set ai is calculated based on equation (6-10)
1
''

 
 iii
i
xyaa (6-10)
6.4 Experiments and Results
This section starts with the evaluation methods used to examine the proposed method
and then shows the experimental results.
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6.4.1 Evaluation and Environmental Setup
6.4.1.1 Distribution
The number of original data samples was M = 6400, which was the upper limit of the
test environment; the fractal sequence parameters were x0=0.1876, y0=0.2859,
μ1=3.8123 and μ2=3.7983. For the proposed method, three experiments were
conducted with parameters as follows:
i) ρ=0.05,  = 3, results in PA≈6.8% .
ii) ρ=0.1,  = 5, results in PA≈12.5%.
iii) ρ=0.5,  = 12, results in PA≈22.4%.
These parameters resulted in perturbation amplitude PA≈6.8%, 12.5% and 22.4%
respectively. In the generalized method, the generalization interval was set to 5, such
as [25, 30], [31, 35] and so on. The parameters for the proposed method were chosen
as reasonable values for the generated dataset.
6.4.1.2 Information Content
The calculations of the added information content for the proposed method,
k-anonymized data and l-diversity were introduced in the chapter 5. The test
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environment was similar to that in chapter 5. Three sets of parameters were used to
evaluate the distortion information content, which were the same as that in the
distribution tests.
6.4.2 Experimental Performance
The experiments were conducted with regard to the quality of perturbation, i.e. to
examine the distribution and the added distortion for the original data. Attack
resistance results are explained in the Appendix.
6.4.2.1 Distribution Tests
Figure 6.10: Distribution Test -- Normal Distribution with PA ≈ 6.8%
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Figure 6.11: Distribution Test -- Uniform Distribution with PA ≈ 6.8%
Figure 6.12: Distribution Test -- Normal Distribution with PA ≈ 12.5%
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Figure 6.13: Distribution Test -- Uniform Distribution with PA ≈ 12.5%
Figure 6.14: Distribution Test -- Normal Distribution with PA ≈ 22.4%
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Figure 6.14: Distribution Test -- Uniform Distribution with PA ≈ 22.4%
Figures 6.10 to 6.15 show the distribution of the original, perturbed and generalized
data. As can be seen from the Figure 6.10 to 6.13, the distribution of the perturbated
data is very close to the original data, while generalization changed the data
distribution.
6.4.2.2 Empirical Information Content Tests
Figures 6.12 to 6.14 show the added information (distortion) from the proposed
method, k-anonymity and l-diversity. As depicted, distortion is higher in the proposed
method than in the other methods, even when perturbation amplitude (PA) is
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relatively low. The figures also show that the added information from the proposed
method increases as PA increases.
Figure 6.12: Information Content Test with PA≈6.8%
CHAPTER 6 μ-FRACTAL DATAPERTURBATION
183
Figure 6.13: Information Content Test with PA≈12.5%
Figure 6.14: Information Content Tests with PA≈22.4%
6.4.2.3 Attack Resistance Tests
Attach resistance tests are presented in the Appendix.
6.5 Discussion
One of the main features of the proposed method is that the μ-FDP is able to
effectively increase the added distortion to a very high level. The method also keeps
the perturbed data within the same data format and value range as the original ones.
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From the data distribution test, the proposed perturbation method maintains the
distribution of the data, and the magnitude of the introduced change can be controlled,
while generalization methods compromise on data utility and alter the distribution of
the original data.
The data privacy attack experiments clearly show that the proposed method is able to
resist both spectral filtering (SPF) and Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction (BE-DR)
attacks which have successfully attacked many data transformation-based privacy
protection techniques [145, 162]. The proposed method also ensures that no matter
what the original data value(s) is, the perturbed data are able to keep the perturbed
values in the same value range as the original. The significance of this feature is that
the perturbed data cannot be distinguished from the original data. The perturbation
parameters control the perturbing effects in the process.
The proposed method requires more parameters compared with the approach
proposed in chapter 5, but provide a better support for large volume of data.
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6.6 Summary
This chapter presents an effective method for data perturbation to provide privacy
protection of numeric data. The effectiveness of the data perturbation method lies in
the fact that it is based on fractal and chaos theory to derive perturbation vectors. A
distinguishing contribution of the proposed method is that it provides maximal utility
for public data analysts who do not have a restoration key while at the same time, it
protects sensitive data from data linkage attacks (discussed in chapter 4). The
usefulness of our algorithm was shown by conducting detailed experiments to
demonstrate its impact on both the data perturbation and maximal data utility features.
The results of the experiments also showed that our perturbation algorithm could be
applied as desired on data with different distributions, namely uniform and normal.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis looked at two privacy preserving data sharing approaches: data sharing
with known recipients (chapters 2 and 3) and with unknown recipients (chapters 4 to
6).
For sharing data with known recipients, a privacy preserving access control model
was proposed. The model addressed three challenges, namely i) the capability to cater
for unique users, ii) multiple privileges, conditional and sequential, controlled
privileges, and iii) user roaming and data roaming in cross-domain environments. The
proposed functional module in chapter 2 contains a system framework based on a
label-based mechanism. The hybrid role-based and attribute-based user privilege
control supports unique users, and a hierarchical control structure on both user and
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data servers is proposed for diverse privileges, conditional privileges and operation
sequences. The designation of a collaborating subject server and an object server
gives more crafted and flexible capability for subject roaming, object roaming and
identifying responsibility of data management in roaming scenarios. A label-based
privilege refinement mechanism enables the management of privilege hierarchies.
Next, the thesis investigated the problem of involving access purpose in the privacy
preserving model and addressed two challenges: the involvement of purpose in both
user control and granular data control, and purpose translation in cross-domain
environments. Chapter 3 presented a hierarchical subject purpose control mothed to
handle user purpose, user obligations and server constraints for unique users. It has an
object classification and description mechanism to deal with object related purpose
that is made up of data owner’s intended purpose, conditional purpose and object
obligations. A purpose translation layer on both subject server and object server
provides consistent translation of the same purpose between different domains. With
incorporating the two functional modules proposed in chapters 2 and 3, the overall
access control model is able to deal with complex, collaborating and organizational
environments, and can be instantiated for practical applications.
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When sharing data with unknown recipients, which is also called data publishing the
challenge was to keep data privacy while optimizing data utility. Data privacy is
preserved if authorized receivers can obtain the original data, while others can only
access processed data and an adversary can not derive the original data, or the
re-constructed results are not close enough to the original data. Utility can indicate
data distribution, data format, or data range.
To balance data privacy and data utility, the thesis proposed two hybrid data privacy
algorithms that combine additive and multiplicative perturbation. The algorithm in
chapter 5 was built on Chebyshev polynomials, and it generated two sequences, one
for the additive and one for the multiplicative step. The involvement of scaling
parameters ensured the perturbed values were in the same data range as the original
data.
The effectiveness of perturbation was examined by looking at entropy, comparison of
distributions and performing two, previously published, classic data privacy attacks.
The attack methods introduced in chapter 4 were Spectral Filter (SPF) and
Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction (BE-DR). The entropy results showed that the
proposed algorithm significantly increased the entropy of the data and outperformed
k-anonymity and l-diversity when the magnitude of the perturbation amplitude was at
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least 40% of the original data. Even when the noise was only 10%, the proposed
method still outperformed k-anonymity. The distribution tests showed that for two
common distributions, normal and uniform, the method proposed in chapter 5 was
able to maintain data utility. The RMSE results showed that the two classic data
reconstruction attacks were not able to reconstruct the original data from the
perturbed data.
The algorithm in chapter 6 was built on a fractal, called Bifurcation diagram. Again,
an additional and multiplicative hybrid scheme was used to incorporate the two
generated fractal sequences. Scaling parameters were used to control the perturbation
and keep the perturbed data similar to the original data.
The method proposed in chapter 6 was examined the same way as in chapter 5. The
entropy test results showed that the proposed algorithm increased the entropy of the
data. The results outperformed k-anonymity and l-diversity for the magnitude of the
perturbation amplitude was at least 5% of the original data. The distribution tests
showed that when the original data was following either of two common distributions,
normal and uniform, the distribution of the perturbed data was close to the original’s.
The RMSE results showed that the two classic data reconstruction attacks were not
successful.
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Future work can look at devising a high level language for the proposed model in Part
I so that it would be easier to deploy to existing organizations; building proper user
management based on the proposed model for contemporary authentication server
databases and evaluating the instantiation performance of privilege refinement in
terms of runtime complexity and memory consumption.
Future work to Part II may investigate the application of the proposed method to
multiple data attributes at one time; applying the proposed methods to information
hiding; evaluation of the performance in terms of runtime complexity for different
scenarios.
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Attack Resistance
1. Description of the Attacks
This section introduces two classic attack methods that are used to evaluate the
proposed data perturbation methods in terms of attack success. The two attacks were
evaluated and summarized in [162].
The assumptions in both attacks are as follows [145].
i) The introduced noise is random, has a zero mean (μnoise=0).
ii) The original data, noise, and perturbed data are in the form of an R by C matrix
respectively, and R = C to facilitate experiments and comparison of different
attack results [162].
iii) The original data set O is square and the elements in the original dataset (O) are
independent of each other, so that O and the covariance of the original data (Ocov)
have distinct and non-zero eigenvalues. This assumption holds in most practical
situations [162].
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iv) The noise dataset matrix and the original dataset are uncorrelated and the
distributions of the noise dataset matrix and the perturbed dataset matrix are
known to the attacker [162]. Since the attacker does not know the distribution of
the original data, the initial assumption is that the original dataset follows a
normal distribution.
v) The perturbed data (P~ ) is public.
1.1 Spectral Filtering
The first attack used for resistance testing is called spectral filtering (SPF) [145, 173],
and is a random matrix-based approach for reconstructing the original dataset from
the perturbed data. Arranging the perturbed data in a matrix, the eigenvalues of this
matrix are used to estimate the introduced noise, while assuming the noise has a
normal distribution. The attack result has two parts: i) the estimated original dataset
matrix and ii) the estimated noise matrix [135, 162].
The calculation steps were presented in [145], evaluated in [162] and are briefly
summarized as follows. According to the assumption, the noise distribution is known
and the variance is σ2. First the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the
perturbation noise λmin and λmax are calculated based on 22min )/11( Q and
22
max )/11( Q , where Q represents the asymptotic value of M/N when the
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number of data samples approaches infinity[145]. In the experiments, Q=1 [162]. The
the eigenvalues λi of the covariance matrix cov~P are computed, and the noise
eigenvalues satisfying λi ≥ λmin and λj ≤ λmax are identified [155].
The metric used to evaluate the success of an SPF attack is the Root Mean Square
Error (RMSE) that measures the difference between the original (oi) and
reconstructed ( io ) data, i.e. RMSE =
2
1
)ˆ(1 


m
i
ii oom
. An RMSE value between 0 and 1
indicates that attackers have a high probability of reconstructing the original data O.
If RMSE =0 then O has been accurately reconstructed; if RMSE is equal or greater
than 1, then it means no data in O has been recovered.
1.2 Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction
The second data reconstruction method is called Bayes-Estimated Data
Reconstruction (BE-DR) which is proposed in [92] and evaluated in [162].
The BE-DR attack steps are briefly summarized as follows. Calculate Ocov by
2
covcov
~  PO for all elements in cov~P and derive the mean vector O of the
original data matrix from the mean vector P~ of perturbed data matrix by PO ~ 
(according the assumption i) that the noise mean is zero), Then, the estimated original
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data elements are calculated by 121cov21cov )/~)(./1(~    POIOo oij [162]. The
success of the EB-DR attack is measured by the RMSE explained in SPF attack.
2. Attack Results
A 6400-item dataset was generated to test the attack resistance of the proposed
method. The data was stored in vector form and then re-formed to matrix form to be
easier to implement attack methods.
In each data reconstruction case, the attack method obtained an estimated data set
which was then evaluated by measuring the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE).
2.1 Chebyshev Data Perturbation
For the attack resistance test, two classic data reconstruction attacks were used,
namely spectral filtering (SPF) and Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction (BE-DR).
Spectral Filtering
This test shows the result of the special filtering (SPF) for varying numbers of data
samples. For each data set, the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) test was executed
five times and the average was calculated. In this test, every RMSE was far greater
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than 1 and the average was 26.1621, so the attack was considered not able to attack
the proposed method. Note: RMSE varied between test runs.
Figure 1: RMSE for SPF Attack
Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction
This test was executed on the same number of data samples, used RMSE to evaluate
the success of the attack. The RMSE result of BE-DR was also far greater than 1, the
average was 23.3614. Therefore, the attack was not successful.
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Figure 2: RMSE for BE-DR Attack
To summarize the evaluations, the proposed method is able to maintain the data
distribution, brings higher added entropy than the compared method and also resists
to SPF and BE-DR attacks.
2.2 μ-Fractal Data Perturbation
Figure 3 shows the SPF attack results. The mean square error (MSE) is more than 39,
which is far above the acceptable value 1, and this means the attack failed to
re-construct the original data. Figure 4 shows the BE-DR attack result. The root mean
square error (RMSE) is more than 23 which is again far above the acceptable value of
1, which means the attack failed to re-construct the original data.
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Spectral Filter (SPF)
Figure 3: SPF Attack Result
Bayes-Estimated Data Reconstruction (BE-DR)
Figure 4: BE-DR Attack Result
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Program Code--Experiments of
Data Perturbation Methods
%Created by Jian Zhong
%Contact email: jian.zhong@rmit.edu.au
%You are free to use this code but you cannot remove the author's
info.
function cdpDiff(M,k,n)
%orgdata=zeros(M);
alpha=4.7; %shift
beta=(-1+n+6)/(n+6);
groupindex=zeros(k);
gamma=1.5;
meancdp=0;
RMS=0;
%M=100;
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MEAN=39;
SD=3;
ptSD=0;
ptvar=zeros(M);
%orgdata=zeros(M);
%orgdataX=normrnd(MEAN,SD,M,1);
%orgdataX = random('norm',MEAN,SD,M, 1);
orgdataX = randi([25,65],1,M);
ptdata =zeros(M,1);
cdpt=zeros(M,1);
cdpt2=zeros(M,1);
pt=zeros(M,1);
diff=zeros(M,1);
orgfid = fopen('orgdata.txt','w');
fprintf(orgfid,'%f\n',orgdataX);
fclose(orgfid);
fid=fopen('orgdata.txt','r');
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for i=1:M
orgdata(i)=fscanf(fid,'%f\n ',1);
end
% A=fscanf(fid,'%f')
% size(A,1)
fclose(fid);
DL=M/k;
t=zeros(k);
t0=0;
t(1)=floor(DL);
groupindex(1)=0;
for i=2:1:k
t(i)=floor(i * DL);
for c=1:1:i-1
t(i)=t(i) - t(c);
end
end
for a=2:1:k
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for j=1:1:a-1
groupindex(a)=t(j)+groupindex(a);
end
end
T1=ChebT(n);
T2=ChebT(n+1);
parafid = fopen('para.txt','w');
fprintf(parafid,'M = %i ; ',M);
fprintf(parafid,'k= %f ; ',k);
fprintf(parafid,'n= %i ; ',n);
fprintf(parafid,'Alpha= %f ; ',alpha);
fprintf(parafid,'Beta= %f ; ',beta);
fprintf(parafid,'Gamma= %f \n',gamma);
fprintf(parafid,'DL= %f \n',DL);
fprintf(parafid,'t = %i ; ',t);
fprintf(parafid,'GroupIndex = %i ; ',groupindex);
fprintf(parafid,'Tn = %i \n',T1);
fclose(parafid);
APPENDIX B
PROGRAM CODE
%disp(cdpt);
for b=1:1:k
%groupindex(i)=t(i)+groupindex(i);
temp=0;
for j=1:1:t(b)
x=-beta+(2*beta*j)/(t(b)+alpha); %CHANGED to cal cdpt it
is ok to use -beta, I also change the beta vaule accordingly.
for p=1:1:n
%cdpt(groupindex(b)+j)=cdpt(groupindex(b)+j)*(x^p)*T(n-p+1)+(x
^p)*T((n+1)-p+1);
cdpt(groupindex(b)+j,1)=cdpt(groupindex(b)+j,1)+(x^p)*T1(n-p+1)
-floor(cdpt(groupindex(b)+j,1)+(x^p)*T1(n-p+1));
%temp=temp+cdpt(groupindex(b)+j);
end
APPENDIX B
PROGRAM CODE
for q=1:1:n+1
cdpt2(groupindex(b)+j,1)=cdpt2(groupindex(b)+j,1)+(x^q)*T2((n+
1)-q+1)-floor(cdpt2(groupindex(b)+j,1)+(x^q)*T2((n+1)-q+1));
end
%temp=temp+cdpt(groupindex(b)+j);
%meancdp=floor(temp*1000)/t(b);
%if cdpt(groupindex(b)+j)>=0 && cdpt2(groupindex(b)+j)>=0
%pt(groupindex(b)+j,1)=mod(floor(gamma*cdpt(groupindex(b)+j,1)
*100),11);
%pt(groupindex(b)+j,1)=floor(gamma*cdpt(groupindex(b)+j,1));
%else
%pt(groupindex(b)+j,1)=-mod(floor(gamma*cdpt(groupindex(b)+j,1)
*100),11); %same mod as above
%pt(groupindex(b)+j,1)=-mod(floor(gamma*cdpt(groupindex(b)+j,1)
));
APPENDIX B
PROGRAM CODE
%end
%pt(groupindex(b)+j)=mod(floor(cdpt(groupindex(b)+j)*100),SD);
%temp=temp+pt(groupindex(b)+j,1);
%meancdp=temp/t(b);
%ptdata(groupindex(b)+j,1)=orgdata(groupindex(b)+j)*(cdpt(grou
pindex(b)+j,1)*0.05+0.95)-floor(orgdata(groupindex(b)+j)*(cdpt
(groupindex(b)+j,1))*0.05+0.95)+cdpt2(groupindex(b)+j,1)+floor
(pt(groupindex(b)+j,1)-meancdp);
ptdata(groupindex(b)+j,1)=orgdata(groupindex(b)+j)*(cdpt(group
index(b)+j,1)*0.01+0.99)+cdpt2(groupindex(b)+j,1)*gamma;
pt(groupindex(b)+j,1)=ptdata(groupindex(b)+j,1)-orgdata(groupi
ndex(b)+j);
RMS=RMS+pt(groupindex(b)+j,1)*pt(groupindex(b)+j,1);
diff(groupindex(b)+j,1)=abs(pt(groupindex(b)+j,1))/orgdata(gro
upindex(b)+j);
APPENDIX B
PROGRAM CODE
end
end
RMS=sqrt(RMS/M);
disp(RMS);
%disp(cdpt);
%disp(cdpt2);
%disp(pt);
%disp(T1);
%disp(T2);
%disp(diff);
ptvar=var(pt(:,1));
%disp(ptvar);
%for o=1:1:M
% ptSD=ptSD+ptvar(o);
%end
%for o=1:1:M
APPENDIX B
PROGRAM CODE
ptSD=ptSD+ptvar;
%end
%disp(ptSD);
ptSD=ptSD/M;
midfid = fopen('mid.txt','w');
fprintf(midfid,'ptSD = %f \n',ptSD);
fprintf(midfid,'cdpi(j) = %f \n',cdpt);
fprintf(midfid,'meancdp = %f \n',meancdp);
fprintf(midfid,'pti(j) = %i \n', pt);
fprintf(midfid,'ptdata = %i \n',ptdata);
fclose(midfid);
compfid = fopen('comp.txt','w');
for d=1:1:M
fprintf(compfid,'%f ',orgdata(d));
fprintf(compfid,'%f \n',ptdata(d,1));
end
fclose(compfid);
APPENDIX B
PROGRAM CODE
pertrbfid = fopen('pertrb.txt','w');
for d=1:1:M
fprintf(pertrbfid,'%f \n ',ptdata(d,1));
end
fclose(pertrbfid);
%ptmean=mean(ptdata);
yorgdatamin=min(diff);
yorgdatamax=max(diff);
yptdatamin=min(diff);
yptdatamax=max(diff);
xorgdata=linspace(yorgdatamin,yorgdatamax,10);
yyorgdata=hist(orgdata,xorgdata);
yyptdata=hist(diff(:,1),xorgdata);
yyorgdata=yyorgdata/M;
yyptdata=yyptdata/M;
APPENDIX B
PROGRAM CODE
hold on
plot(xorgdata,yyptdata,'c','LineWidth',3);
hold off
